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Judging Ordinary Meaning
AB 5 TRAC T. Judges generally begin their interpretive task by looking for the ordinary meaning
of the language of the law. And they often end there - out of respect for the notice function of the
law or deference to the presumed intent of the lawmaker.
Most everyone agrees on the primacy of the ordinary meaning rule. Yet scholars roundly be-
moan the indeterminacy of the communicative content of the language of the law. And they pivot
quickly to other grounds for interpretation.
We agree with the diagnosis of important scholars in this field - from Richard Fallon and Cass
Sunstein to Will Baude and Stephen Sachs -but reject their proposed cures. Instead of setting
aside the threshold question of ordinary meaning, we seek to take it seriously. We do so through
theories and methods developed in the scholarly field designed for the study of language: linguis-
tics.
We identify theoretical and operational deficiencies in our law's attempts to credit the ordinary
meaning of the law and present linguistic theories and tools to assess it more reliably. Our frame-
work examines iconic problems of ordinary meaning - from the famous "no vehicles in the park"
hypothetical to two Supreme Court cases (United States v. Muscarello and Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific
Saipan, Ltd.) and a Seventh Circuit opinion by Judge Richard Posner (in United States v. Costello).
We show that the law's conception of ordinary meaning implicates empirical questions about lan-
guage usage. And we present linguistic tools from a field known as corpus linguistics that can help
to answer these empirical questions.
When we speak of ordinary meaning we are asking an empirical question - about the sense of
a word or phrase that is most likely implicated in a given linguistic context. Linguists have devel-
oped computer-aided means of answering such questions. We propose to import those methods
into the law's methodology of statutory interpretation. And we consider and respond to criticisms
of their use by lawyers and judges.
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INTRODUCTION
A key component of the meaning we ascribe to law concerns its "communi-
cative content." Professor Lawrence Solum has spoken of such content as con-
sisting of the "linguistic meaning" of the words of a statute or regulation. We
can also think of it as encompassing the "intended" meaning of the lawmaker, to
use the words of Professor Richard Fallon,2 or the "contextual meaning" under-
stood by the public, as framed by Professors Will Baude and Stephen Sachs.'
This is the threshold question for the "standard picture" of legal interpretation,
which starts with a search for the "ordinary communicative content" of the
words of the law.4 That search is the focus of this article. We highlight deficien-
cies in the law's search for ordinary meaning and introduce a tool imported from
linguistics - corpus linguistic analysis - that can help overcome some of those
deficiencies.
Most everyone - not just textualists anymore - agrees that "[t] here are ex-
cellent reasons for the primacy of the ordinary meaning rule." Most of the rea-
sons stem from the purported determinacy of the ordinary meaning inquiry. We
1. Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479,
480 (2013) (distinguishing the "communicative content" of a legal text from its "legal con-
tent," or in other words "the legal norms the text produces").
2. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal "Meaning" and Its Implications for Theories of Legal
Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 1235, 1249-50 (2015) (speaking of these and other conceptions
of the communicative or "conversational" content of the words of the law).
3. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 13o HARv. L. REV. 1079, 11o6
(2017).
4. See id. at io86 (speaking of the "Standard Picture," or the "view that we can explain our legal
norms by pointing to the ordinary communicative content of our legal texts,' in other words
"an instrument's meaning as a matter of language"); see also Mark Greenberg, The Standard
Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 39, 48 (Leslie Green
& Brian Leiter eds., 2011) (describing the "Standard Picture"). Here and elsewhere we some-
times conflate "communicative content" and "ordinary meaning." Yet we acknowledge that
some legal terms are used in an extraordinary sense - as with legal terms of art. And we rec-
ognize that legal language may be viewed as a distinct dialect, and thus that "communicative
content" may sometimes be understood to encompass "extraordinary" (specialized legal)
meaning. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language
of the Law 4-5 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 17-
262, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract id=2928936 [http://perma.cc
/2V4V-C69M] (asserting that the Constitution is written in the "language of the law," not
ordinary English, and thus that its interpretation should account for the canons and legal
conventions that would have been accepted by the legal community at the time of the found-
ing).
5. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAw: A PRIMER ON How To READ STATUTES AND




speak of a search for meaning "not in the subjective, multiple mind of Congress
but in the understanding of the objectively reasonable person."6 And we gener-
ally conclude that the search for such meaning "matches up well with our under-
standing of what the rule of law entails"': it assures notice to the public, protects
reliance interests, assures consistency of application, and respects the will of the
legislative body.8 So although we recognize that "ordinary meaning does not al-
ways yield predictable answers to statutory issues," we tend to accept that it
"yield [s] greater predictability than any other single methodology."'
This premise has taken hold in our courts: "[W]e're all textualists now."o
That holds true at least in the sense that most judges begin the interpretive in-
quiry with the words of a statute - and even end there if they find the meaning
of those words to be "plain.""
Yet the academy has been less sure of the premises of this trend. Scholars like
Fallon and Cass Sunstein generally have endorsed the value of determinacy but
roundly doubted the judge's ability to find it in the mere "communicative con-
tent" or "ordinary meaning" of statutory text. 12 There are two dimensions to this
6. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y59, 65 (1988).
7. ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 35.
8. See id. ("A polity governed by the rule of law aspires to have legal directives that are known to
the citizenry, that are predictable in their application, and that officials can neutrally and con-
sistently apply based upon objective criteria.").
9. Id. at 36.
10. Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue withJustice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARv.
L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses
-statutory-interpretation [http://perma.cc/3BCF-FEFR].
n1. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 6o (2d ed. 2013) ("Over the last quarter-century, textualism has had an ex-
traordinary influence on how federal courts approach questions of statutory interpretation.
When the Court finds the text to be clear in context, it now routinely enforces the statute as
written."); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1756-58 (2010) (concluding,
based on a comprehensive study of state court approaches to statutory interpretation, that
state courts are engaged in an "effort[] to increase predictability in statutory interpretation,"
and that they give primacy to text and decline to look to external sources of meaning if they
find the text "plain").
12. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1255-63, 1272 (exploring a range of possible meanings of commu-
nicative or "conversational" meaning, including "semantic" or "literal" meaning, "contextual"
meaning embraced by "shared presuppositions of speakers and listeners;' "intended mean-
ing;' and others, and asserting that there accordingly is "no single, linguistic fact of the matter
concerning what statutory or constitutional provisions mean"); Cass R. Sunstein, There Is
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skepticism - questions about the meaning of the law's search for "ordinary mean-
ing" and concerns about a judge's ability to measure or assess it with any degree
of determinacy."
As Baude and Sachs say, "we can't treat the meaning of [a given text's] lan-
guage as the only source of its legal effect."14 Our law of interpretation may have
good reasons to depart from the "standard picture" -to substitute "fake" an-
swers to linguistic questions for real ones." It is doubtless true, moreover, that
some of our rules of interpretation dictate a "process" that "often looks nothing
like a straight-forward search for linguistic meaning."1 6
We share these commentators' concerns but offer a different solution. In this
Article, we show that the law has done a poor job conceptualizing the notion of
ordinary meaning, and we ultimately agree that " [u] ncertainty and division" in
assessing such meaning "seem inevitable" under the methods currently resorted
to by judges." But we do not see these problems as an invitation to abandon the
search for the ordinary communicative content of the law in favor of case-by-
case "interpretive eclecticism."'" Nor do we find in the indeterminacy of the
search for ordinary meaning a broad license for "normative judgments" about
whatever "interpretation" "makes our constitutional system better rather than
Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193, 194-95 (2015) (identifying possi-
ble notions of meaning, including authorial intention, public meaning, moral reading, and
others).
13. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1272 (noting that "there can be a multitude of linguistically perti-
nent facts, generating different senses of meaning, which in turn support avariety of claims");
id. at 1268-69 (asserting that " [u]ncertainty and division" in measuring ordinary meaning are
"inevitable," that evidence of "communicative or assertive content, understood as a matter of
linguistic fact, is often sparse, minimal, or indeterminate as applied to particular cases," and
that we "cannot proceed by taking or imagining the outcome of an opinion poll" about ordi-
nary meaning).
14. Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1o88; see also id. at 1096 ("We see this as one of the most
important functions of a legal system: to replace real answers with fake ones. There may be
real answers out there to lots of important normative and policy questions, such as how fast
we should drive on the highway, what tax policy is best, and so on. But people persistently
disagree on the real answers, and the legal system helpfully offers fake answers instead - an-
swers that hopefully are somewhat close to the real ones, but on which society (mostly) agrees
and which allow us (mostly) to get along.").
15. Id. at 1082, 1o96.
16. Id. at io88.
17. Fallon, supra note 2, at 1268.
is. Id. at 1305, 1308 (describing "interpretive eclecticism" as involving the choice of the "best in-
terpretive outcome as measured against the normative desiderata of substantive desirability,





worse."" This kind of "interpretation" overrides - rather than protects - the val-
ues served by the ordinary meaning rule. It undermines reliance and fair-notice
interests and gives voice to the will of judges, not lawmakers.
We may eventually throw up our hands and conclude that some questions of
ordinary meaning have no good answers. Or we may conclude that the law has
good reason to substitute a nonlinguistic answer that vindicates policies more
important than the ones advanced by the "standard picture."20 But we cannot
skip or assume away the threshold question of ordinary meaning. While the
search for ordinary meaning is hard, the premises of this inquiry are too deeply
embedded in our law and too clearly rooted in important policy considerations
to give up at the first sight of difficulty or indeterminacy, or to judge the enter-
prise on the fuzzy premises or mistaken methodologies of the past. So we take
up the inquiry here.
Our thesis is that words have meaning, and that meaning can be theorized
and measured using principles and methods devised in the field of linguistics.
When we speak of ordinary meaning, we are asking an empirical question-
about the sense of a word or phrase that is most likely implicated in a given lin-
guistic context.2 1 Linguists have developed computer-aided means of answering
such questions. We propose to import those methods into the modern theory
and practice of interpretation, and we identify problems in the methods that the
law has been using to address these issues.
Our proposed methodology is a set of tools utilized in a field called corpus
linguistics. Corpus linguists study language through data derived from large
bodies- corpora- of naturally occurring language. They look for patterns in
meaning and usage in large databases of actual written language. And we think
their methods may easily be adapted in a manner that will allow us to conceptu-
alize and measure the "standard picture" in a much more careful way.22
ig. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 193-94.
20. In other words, maybe the "standard picture" doesn't claim to be a picture of American law.
Cf Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1o89 (arguing that there may be "real trouble for the stand-
ard picture, at least if it claims to be a picture of American law").
21. Judge Posner framed the ordinary meaning question in this (empirical) way in his opinion in
United States v. Costello, 666 F.3 d. 1040, 1044 (7 th Cit. 2012). There he proposed to answer
this question using the results of a Google search. We think Judge Posner's instincts were
right but his methods fell a bit short, as explained below. See discussion infra Section I.B.3.
22. Corpus linguistics is not the only linguistic discipline that relies on empirical observation and
experimentation. Empirical observation is a vital component of a variety of linguistic disci-
plines, including sociolinguistics, historical linguistics, phonetics, discourse analysis, field lin-
guistics, computational linguistics, cognitive linguistics, and psycholinguistics. As we will dis-
cuss below, this Article focuses on corpus linguistics, but we do not mean to suggest that other
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In Part I, we begin by noting the circumstances in which the "standard pic-
ture" controls under statutory interpretation, highlighting exemplary cases
where the ordinary communicative content of the words of a statute seems to
dictate the court's holding. Next, we identify shortcomings in the law's attempt
to give effect to that communicative content -shortcomings in both the theory
of ordinary meaning and in attempts to operationalize (or measure) it. In Part II,
after outlining these two sets of problems, we introduce theories and empirical
methods from the field of corpus linguistics that may help us deliver on the
promise of an objective inquiry into ordinary meaning.2 3 In Part III, we apply
these tools to our exemplary cases. We close, in Part IV, by responding to actual
and anticipated criticisms of our approach and by highlighting unresolved issues
that must be addressed going forward.
I. ORDINARY MEANING IN THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION
Everyone agrees that our sense of the ordinary communicative content of le-
gal language is an important starting point for interpretation. All agree, moreo-
ver, that the law should credit that content at least sometimes. This holds even for
those who doubt our ability to settle on a single notion of meaning or to assess
it with any degree of consistency.24
empirical linguistic disciplines could not be brought to bear on questions of ordinary mean-
ing. We briefly discuss a few of these approaches below.
23. Some judges (present company included) are beginning to take note of the deficiencies we
highlight here and to try to address them. In a few recent cases, judges have made a studied
effort to define the inquiry into ordinary meaning more precisely. And, importantly, they have
presented empirical analysis in support of their conclusions. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 885
N.W.2d 832, 838-39 & n.29 (Mich. 2016) (citing a Utah Supreme Court opinion in support of
the methodology of corpus linguistics and relying on corpus linguistic data to buttress the
court's interpretation of the term "information" in a Michigan statute forbidding the use of
"information" provided by a law enforcement officer if compelled under threat of employment
sanction); id. at 85o-51 n-14 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
another Utah Supreme Court opinion and relying on corpus linguistic data, but drawing a
different inference from the data); State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 68-75, 356 P.3d 1258 (Lee,
Associate C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (advancing corpus lin-
guistic data in support of his interpretation of the phrase "discharge[] a firearm" in a state
statute); State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶ 27 & n.6, 308 P.3d 517 (presenting corpus linguistic
data in support of the court's construction of the phrase "out of the state" in a tolling provision
for criminal statutes of limitations under Utah law); J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby
E.Z.), 2011 UT 38, ¶ 89 & nn.23-24, 266 P.3d 702 (Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (advocating the use of corpus linguistic data in support of his interpretation
of "custody" proceeding under the federal Parental Kidnapping Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 17 38A (20o6)).




Judges are generally even more sanguine about the matter. The case law in
this field is marked by numerous references to the "standard picture." Judges
routinely advert to the idea of crediting the "ordinary meaning" of statutory
text.25  here such meaning is viewed as "plain," moreover, judges consistently
declare the interpretive enterprise to be at an end.2 6 The general rule is to credit
the communicative content of statutory text where it is "plain," and in that event,
to close the door to the consideration of extratextual sources of meaning or in-
tent.2 7
A variation on the theme applies in the realm of substantive canons of con-
struction or principles of deference. The rule of lenity, for example, says that
genuine ambiguities in criminal laws are resolved in favor of the defendant;28
the converse is the notion that "the rule of lenity has no application when the
statute is clear."29 Chevron deference is similar: the courts defer to agencies only
where the terms of the statute are ambiguous.o
25. See, e.g., Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (2014) (" [W]e give the term its ordinary
meaning"); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2091 (2014) ("In settling on a fair reading
of a statute, it is not unusual to consider the ordinary meaning of a defined term. . . ."); Mo-
hamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 454 (2012) ("Because the [Act] does not define the
term 'individual,' we look first to the word's ordinary meaning."); Mac's Shell Serv., Inc. v.
Shell Oil Prods. Co., 559 U.S. 175, 182 (2010) ("We ... give [the relevant] terms their ordinary
meanings.").
26. See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REv.
539, 539 (2017) (characterizing the "plain meaning rule" as a "compromise" in which "other
information can't be considered" if "the statute's meaning is plain," but in which other infor-
mation "comes in" if "it isn't plain").
27. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 35
(1999) ("No one seriously doubts that interpretation of statutes turns largely on textual
meaning."); Gluck, supra note 11, at 1758 (stating that the "modified textualism" approach
embraced in most state courts "ranks interpretive tools in a clear order -textual analysis, then
legislative history, then default judicial presumptions - and it includes legislative history in
the hierarchy").
28. How much ambiguity, of course, is a difficult question. See Abramski v. United States, 134 S.
Ct. 2259, 2272 n.io (2014) (asserting that the rule applies only if "there remains a grievous
ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute" that cannot be resolved - if the Court is left to "simply
guess as to what Congress intended" (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2209
(2013)); id. at 2281 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the rule should apply if "after all
legitimate tools of interpretation" have been employed "a reasonable doubt persists" (quoting
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, io8 (1990))); ANTONIN SCALIA &BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAw: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 299 (2012) (decrying the "multiplicity
of expressed standards" for invoking the rule of lenity, "leav[ing] open the crucial ques-
tion ... of how much ambiguousness constitutes an ambiguity" (quoting United States v.
Hansen, 7 7 2 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1985))).
29. See SCALIA& GARNER, supra note 28, at 301.
30. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
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However, commentators are undoubtedly right to question the determinacy
of the inquiry into ordinary meaning. The problem, as noted, is twofold- going
both to the law's conception of ordinary meaning and to our judges' attempts to
measure it. First is a problem of theory: ironically, we have no ordinary meaning
of "ordinary meaning."" The same goes for "plain meaning." "Courts and schol-
ars sometimes use the phrase 'plain meaning' to denote something like ordinary
meaning," or in other words, "the meaning one would normally attribute to [the]
words" of a statute "given limited information about their context."3 2 Other
times "plain meaning" is used to denote obvious meaning-i.e., "the meaning
that is clear."" This is the sense at work in the "plain meaning rule."34
Second is a problem of operationalization or measurement. The concern here
is that even if we could settle on a theory of ordinary or plain meaning, we are
unsure how to assess it. "Uncertainty and division seem inevitable."" That is
true because the question of intended or understood meaning is an empirical
one, and judges cannot "proceed by taking or imagining the outcome of an opin-
ion poll" as to intended or perceived meaning.36 The problem is underscored by
the tools (mis)used by judges to try to answer this empirical question (resort to
dictionary definitions or even a word's etymology, for example, as explored be-
low).
The theoretical and measurement problems plaguing the ordinary meaning
inquiry are even bigger than most have acknowledged. The depth of the problem
is best illustrated by reference to concrete examples in the case law. Throughout
this article we consider the following:
* Is a person guilty of carrying a firearm (under a federal sentencing en-
hancement provision) in connection with a drug crime if he merely
31. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 792-93 ( 4 th ed. 2007) (noting the irony that "'plain meaning'
is ... a deeply ambiguous term" and highlighting differences in the ways courts use the terms
"plain meaning," often to refer to a sense that is "quite clear in a literal sense;' and "ordinary
meaning;' which may mean "the best (most coherent) textual understanding that emerges
after close textual analysis"); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 808 (1983) (observing, as to the "'start with the
words' canon;' that "[i]t is ironic that a principle designed to clarify should be so ambigu-
ous").
32. Baude & Doerfler, supra note 26, at 545.
33. Id.
34. Id.





transports it to a drug deal in a locked glove compartment of the car he
is driving? This was the question presented in United States v. Musca-
rello. " The Muscarello Court was sharply divided. All nine Justices
agreed that the question came down to the "ordinary meaning" of the
notion of carrying ajirearm. Yet they divided 5-4 on whether the ordinary
sense of that phrase encompassed the conveyance of a gun in a glove
compartment. Each side proffered varying senses of the meaning of "or-
dinary meaning" and claimed support for their view in sources ill-suited
to providing a reliable answer to the empirical question presented-
looking to dictionaries, to isolated examples of language from literature,
and even to the etymology of the verb carry.
* Is a litigation expert who is paid to translate written documents from
one language to another an interpreter under a statute authorizing an
award of costs for prevailing parties who utilize such an expert in litiga-
tion? This question arose in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd." The
Court agreed that the case came down to a matter of ordinary meaning
of the term interpreter. Yet again the Court was divided, this time 6-3. In
Taniguchi, the majority and dissent agreed that the more common sense
of interpreter referred to a person engaged in simultaneous oral transla-
tion. But again, they resorted only to dictionaries and similar sources for
their conclusions. They also disagreed about what the search for ordinary
meaning ultimately entails, with the majority insisting that only the more
common sense of the term is covered and the dissent asserting that a
permissible sense should also count.
* Is a woman who allows her boyfriend- an undocumented immigrant -
to sleep at her apartment guilty of harboring an alien under a federal stat-
ute criminalizing that act? This question arose in United States v. Cos-
tello." Like Muscarello and Taniguchi, Costello involved a statutory term
broad enough to encompass both parties' positions. Sometimes harbor
refers to the mere act of providing shelter, but it may also indicate the
sort of sheltering that is aimed at concealment. How is the court to de-
cide which sense is the ordinary one? Writing for the majority, Judge
Posner recognized the deficiencies of standard methods -principally,
dictionaries - in answering that question. So he proceeded to a search
37. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
38. 566 U.S. 560 (2012).
39. 666 F.3d 1040 ( 7th Cir. 2012).
799
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
for data, and he did so using the tool that is perhaps most familiar to us
today. He performed a Google search.
Is this the best we can do? Below, we use these cases to highlight the theoretical
and operational deficiencies in the law's search for ordinary meaning.
A. Theoretical Shortcomings
The case law embraces a startlingly broad range of senses of ordinary mean-
ing. When judges speak of ordinary meaning, they often seem to be speaking to
a question of relative frequency- as in a point on the following continuum:
POSSIBLE 4 COMMON 4 MOST FREQUENT 4 EXCLUSIVE
At the left end of the continuum is the idea of a possible or linguistically
permissible meaning-a sense of a word or phrase that is attested in a known
body of written or spoken language. A meaning is a possible one if we can say
that "you can use that word in that way" (as attested by evidence that other peo-
ple have used the word in that way in the past). Yet a possible meaning may be
an uncommon or unnatural sense of a given term. In that case, we might note
that a given sense of a term is not common in a given linguistic setting, even if it
is possible to speak that way. And even a common sense of a term might not be
the most frequent use of it in a certain context.
The notion of plain meaning adds the final point to the continuum. When
courts speak of plain meaning (as a concept distinct from ordinary meaning)
they generally mean to "denote obvious meaning" or "meaning that is clear."40 A
plain - obvious or clear - meaning would be more than most frequent. It would
be nearly exclusive.
The four points on the continuum can be illustrated by a range of senses of
the term vehicle in the hypothetical "no vehicles in the park" provision.4 1 One
attested sense of vehicle is the notion of a "carrier" or "agent of transmission."4
That sense could sweep broadly. If we are thinking of the carrier sense of vehicle,
the "no vehicles in the park" prohibition could possibly be viewed as covering a
40. Baude & Doerfler, supra note 26, at 545.
41. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-15
(1958). In this Section, we make some suppositions on the points on the continuum-on
which senses of vehicle are possible, common, and most frequent. We do so to illustrate the
range of senses of ordinary meaning. We will move from supposition to empirical analysis of
these questions later. See infra Section III.C.2.a.




dog or cat, which could be referred to as a vehicle (as a carrier of infection). Yet
that sense of vehicle would not be viewed as a natural or common one in this
linguistic setting. If the "no vehicles" ordinance is aimed at only common senses
of vehicle, we likely would not deem it to prohibit pets. Alternatively, we could
say that the meaning of vehicle in this setting is plain or clear, meaning that the
exclusive sense of vehicle is one that eliminates the possibility of its extension to
pets.
Is a bicycle a vehicle covered by the ordinance? Perhaps so - as encompassed
by the sense of vehicle as "a means of carrying or transporting something: con-
veyance."43 This sense of vehicle could easily be viewed as a common sense of
vehicle - certainly more common than the sense of an infection carrier noted
above. But conveyance may not be the most common- the statistically most fre-
quent - sense of vehicle in this linguistic setting (an outdoor public park). If we
are looking for the most frequent sense of vehicle in this context,44 we might un-
derstand the term to encompass only motor vehicles, and thus not to cover the
bicycle.
The four points on the frequency continuum do not completely capture the
range of senses of ordinary meaning embraced by our courts. Sometimes judges
seem to have reference to a fifth notion of ordinary- a notion of linguistic proto-
type.45 Aprototype is a sense, or example of a sense, that is viewed as most strongly
associated with a given term in a given context. And that may jibe with the way
we separate senses or definitions in our minds. A difference in word meaning
may "be represented in cognition not as a set of criterial features with clear-cut
boundaries" the way a dictionary would represent things, but instead "in terms
43 Id.
44. This notion of "ordinariness" is attested in the Oxford English Dictionary. See 1o THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 912 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "ordinary" as "Of language, usage, dis-
course, etc.: that most commonly found or attested . . . ."); see also Lawrence M. Solan &
Tammy Gales, Finding Ordinary Meaning in Law: The Judge, the Dictionary or the Corpus?, 1
INT'L J. LEGAL DISCOURSE 253, 263 (2016) ("'Ordinary meaning, especially as applied to par-
ticular words and phrases, is a distributional fact. A usage is 'ordinary' when it predomi-
nates.").
45. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (determining whether an
"airplane" was a "vehicle" for the purposes of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919,
and stating: "When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only
the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft . . . ." (em-
phasis added)). This notion of a "picture" "evoke[d] in the common mind" maps very well
onto the concept of prototype.
8o1
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of prototypes (the clearest cases, best examples) of the category."46 Thus, proto-
type analysis has shown that people consider chair to be a more prototypical ex-
ample of furniture than stool,4 7 automobile to be a more prototypical vehicle than
yacht,4 8 and robin to be a more prototypical bird than ostrich.49
Prototype is another way to conceive of the notion of ordinary meaning in
the law.so Ajudge who approaches the question of ordinary meaning by attempt-
ing to determine the most prototypical example of a given sense of a term is
searching for a linguistic prototype." Under this approach, the ordinary (pro-
totype) sense of vehicle would be the one that is most "vehicle-like," perhaps en-
compassing a passenger vehicle with four wheels and an engine. If that is our sense
of the ordinary meaning of vehicle, we might conclude that the hypothetical or-
dinance prohibits cars and trucks but not motorized scooters.52
This range of meaning can also be illustrated through our three feature cases.
We turn to them here.
46. Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representation of Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
192, 193 (1975).
47. Id. at 229.
48. Id. at 230.




See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM.&MARYL. REV. 57, 67-68 (1998)
[hereinafter Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity] ("In the realm of statutory interpretation,
judges often evoke the canon that they are to give words in a statute their 'ordinary' meaning.
Prototype analysis tells us that the notion of ordinary meaning has a cognitive basis."); Law-
rence M. Solan, Why Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great: Words and Rules in Legal Interpre-
tation, 26 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 243, 258 (2001) ("Some Supreme Court cases concerning statu-
tory interpretation can be seen as battles among the justices over definitions versus
prototypes." (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993))); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 850 (discussing prototypical meaning in the context of statutory interpreta-
tion); Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists' New Text, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 2027, 2042-55
(2005) [hereinafter Solan, The New Textualists' New Text] ("One function of the ordinary
meaning approach is to use prototypical experiences as a proxy for contextualization."); The
Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Leading Cases, 112 HARv. L. REv. 355, 362 (1998) ("[W]hen a leg-
islature uses non-technical terms . . . it is likely that both the legislature and the general public
interpret the term in accordance with its prototypical meaning.").
Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, supra note So, at 67-68.
This conclusion, however, cannot be derived with mere intuition. The discovery of a proto-





1. Muscarello v. United States
In Muscarello the Court was asked to interpret a statute calling for a five-year
mandatory prison term for a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and
in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime."" Frank Muscarello was convicted on
drug charges after he was shown to have transported a gun in the locked glove
compartment of his car to a drug deal. The question presented was whether that
counted as "carrying" under the statute. Both the majority (Justice Breyer) and
dissenting (Justice Ginsburg) opinions agreed that the proper interpretation of
"carries a firearm" came down to the "ordinary English meaning" of that
"phrase."54 Yet neither opinion settled on a single sense of "ordinary." Instead,
both opinions slide back and forth along the continuum, without acknowledging
that they are doing so.
At some points Justice Breyer seems to employ a merely "common" sense of
ordinary. For example, he asserts that the transport in a vehicle sense of carry is
ordinary given that "many" - "perhaps more than one-third" - of the instances
of carrying a firearm in the New York Times and U.S. News databases reflect that
sense,S and he concludes that "the word 'carry' in its ordinary sense includes car-
rying in a car."56 Yet elsewhere Justice Breyer seems to speak of the car-carrying
sense as most frequent. He reasons that 1) the "ordinary English" sense of carry
is to transport it in a vehicle; 2) the bear personally sense is "special"; and 3) "we
believe Congress intended to use the word in its primary sense and not in this
latter, special way."57
Justice Ginsburg's dissent is also inconsistent. In concluding that the person-
ally bearing sense is ordinary, Justice Ginsburg asserts that it is "hardly implau-
sible, nor at odds with an accepted meaning" of the statutory terms. 8 That is the
language of possibility or commonality.' Elsewhere, however, Justice Ginsburg
seems to speak in terms of personally bearing as the most frequent sense of the
53. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126 (1998) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)
(2012)).
54. Id. at 127; id. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
ss. Id. at 129 (majority opinion).
56. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 149 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 143-44 (asserting "that 'carry' is a word commonly used to convey various messages,'
and that it "could mean" either personally bear or transport in a vehicle).
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term-in noting, in response to Justice Breyer's statistics, "what meaning
showed up some two-thirds of the time."60
2. Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.
Taniguchi was a personal injury case.61 The plaintiff was a Japanese baseball
player suing for medical expenses and lost income from contracts he was unable
to honor as a result of injuries at the defendant's resort.62 The defense "paid to
have various documents translated from Japanese to English,"63 and when the
district court dismissed Taniguchi's case on summary judgment, the defense
submitted a request for compensation for the amounts it paid for document
translation. As in Muscarello, the Taniguchi case came down to ordinary meaning.
Here the operative language was from a statute allowing the prevailing party in
federal litigation to recover certain costs, including those incurred by an "inter-
preter."64
This case also seems to turn on the operative notion of ordinary meaning.
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito concludes that the ordinary sense of inter-
preter is oral translator: "an interpreter is normally understood as one who trans-
lates orally from one language to another."65 While justice Alito says that written
translator is possible, he concludes that this is "hardly a common or ordinary
meaning."66 Indeed, Justice Alito characterizes the written translator notion of in-
terpreter as "obsolete," citing dictionaries to support that conclusion.6 7
Justice Ginsburg's dissent acknowledges that interpreter "commonly refers to
translators of oral speech" but concludes that the term "more than occasionally"
is "used to encompass those who translate written speech as well."68 This is the
core basis of the view of the Taniguchi dissenters. They do not expressly disagree
with Justice Alito's assertion that the oral translator notion is most common; they
6o. Id. at 143.
61. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012).
62. Id. at 562.
63. Id. at 563.
64. Id. at 562.
65. Id. at 569.
66. Id.
67. Id.




are simply saying that both common senses of the term should count as ordi-
nary.6 9
3. United States v. Costello
The defendant in Costello was charged with knowingly "conceal [ing], har-
bor[ing], or shield[ing] from detection" an "alien in any place, including any
building or any means of transportation."o Her alleged crime was "having per-
mitted [her] boyfriend to live with her,"" knowing that he was an "illegal al-
ien."72 The principal question presented was whether the ordinary meaning of
the verb harbor required proof of concealment.
As in Taniguchi, the difference between the majority and dissent in Costello
seems to come down largely to the conception of the meaning of ordinary mean-
ing. Judge Posner, writing for the majority, warns of the perils of overreliance on
the dictionary to resolve questions of ordinary meaning. And he directs the or-
dinary meaning analysis to an empirical inquiry, which he proposes to resolve by
means of a Google search."
Judge Posner's reliance on his Google results places his sense of ordinary
meaning on the frequency continuum. He uses Google to look for relative num-
bers of "hits" for phrases like "harboring fugitives" and "harboring guests."74
Because Judge Posner found more hits for the former than for the latter, he con-
cludes that "'harboring,' as the word is actually used, has a connotation ... of
deliberately safeguarding members of a specified group from the authorities."7
This is a "most frequent" sense of ordinariness - and a blatantly empirical exam-
ple of that inquiry.
The Costello dissent takes a different tack. In concluding that the providing
shelter notion of harbor falls within the statute, Judge Manion asserts that "the
ordinary meaning of 'harboring' certainly includes 'providing shelter to.' 76 In
support of this point, Judge Manion cites definitions from dictionaries in print
69. Id. (asserting that the written translator sense is an "acceptable usage" even if it is "not 'the
most common usage"' (quoting id. at 568 (majority opinion))).
70. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1041 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
5 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012)).
71. Id. at 1043.
72. Id. at 1042.
73. Id. at 1044-45.
74. Id. at 1044.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1052 (Manion, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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at the time of the statute's enactment. He says that these dictionaries show that
" [t]his was a common understanding of the term when the term 'harbor' was first
added to the statute in 1917, and when the statute was amended and the term
retained in 1952."
What can we learn from these cases? Our judges purport to be speaking of a
consistent, common sense of ordinary meaning. But they switch back and forth
between different senses of ordinary meaning, usually without acknowledging
the inconsistency. Sometimes (as in Muscarello) judges embrace varying senses
of ordinary meaning within a single opinion. Elsewhere (as in Taniguchi and
Costello) the seemingly nuanced distinction between different senses of ordinary
meaning becomes outcome-determinative. This is problematic-not just for
statutory interpretation, but also for the rule of law."
B. Operational Shortcomings
The theoretical deficiencies identified above are one element of the problem.
Another is operational -in the way we seek to identify or measure the ordinary
meaning of statutory terms. Typically, this assessment is made at a gut level, on
the basis of a judge's linguistic intuition, without recognition of the empirical
nature of the question.
A judge considering the prohibition on vehicles in the park, for example,
would reject out of hand the notion that the ordinance extends to pets, insisting
(without further analysis or support) that the infection carrier sense of vehicle is
an outlier- an extraordinary meaning. A parallel conclusion would be likely in
response to an attempt to extend the no vehicles ordinance to bicycles. We under-
stand vehicle to encompass a conveyance on wheels, but again a court seems likely
to jump to the conclusion that the ordinary sense of vehicle is motor vehicle, and
that a bicycle does not count.
These conclusions seem uncontroversial. But the judge who makes them is
making an empirical assessment. Gut-level empirics probably will not bother us
if they go only to a holding that a pet or bicycle is not a vehicle prohibited in the
77. Id. (emphasis added) (first citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE 981 (1917) (defining "harbor" as "[t]o afford lodging to; to entertain as a
guest; to shelter; to receive; to give refuge to"); and then citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 376 (John P. Bethel et al. eds., 1953) (defining "harbor" as "to entertain as a guest;
to shelter; to give a refuge to")).
78. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1089-90 (noting that "we have to decide which meaning,




park. But what about a motorized scooter or a golf cart? These are harder ques-
tions. And here we may have more cause for concern about the lack of transpar-
ency and determinacy.
With this in mind, judges sometimes turn to other grounds for their assess-
ment of ordinary meaning, looking up a word in a dictionary or even turning to
the word's etymology. A common use of a dictionary involves simple cherry-
picking. "Instead of acknowledging and rejecting contrary senses of a statutory
term, judges tend to ignore them-identifying only the sense of a word they
deem ordinary without acknowledging any others."" As to vehicle, for example,
a judge might simply cite a definition referring to an automobile and assert,
without more, that the term's ordinary meaning does not encompass a motor
scooter, or maybe even a golf cart. That is troubling - a judge who cherry-picks
a preferred dictionary definition while ignoring an alternative is misusing the
dictionary.
Some judges, to their credit, are more transparent. Instead of ignoring a con-
trary definition- the conveyance on wheels notion of vehicle, for example - a judge
may acknowledge competing senses but find a basis for embracing one as ordi-
nary. For example, a judge might prefer the definition that appears first in a dic-
tionary's list of senses, or cite the etymology of the statutory term. Neither of
these approaches is defensible, however, for reasons explained immediately be-
low in our critique of the Court's ordinary meaning analysis in Muscarello and
Taniguchi. Costello, on the other hand, acknowledges some of the problems we
identify and turns to Google, albeit in a manner that raises a new set of problems.
1. Muscarello v. United States
The Muscarello majority invokes both sense ranking and etymology in sup-
port of its holding. Justice Breyer acknowledges that carry can be understood to
mean either transport in a vehicle or bear on your person.o But he embraces the
79. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72 ¶ 53, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); see also, e.g., Kovach v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 587 F.3d 323,
346 (6th Cir. 2009) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring other
definitions in basing its presentation of the "ordinary meaning" of "accidental" on one defini-
tion without regard to others); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3 d 868, 878 ( 9 th Cir.
2002) (ignoring broader definitions in favor of a narrow definition as "ordinary meaning" of
"intercept"); United States v. Warner Bros. Well Drilling, No 89-5494, 1990 WL 37610, at
*2-3 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1990) (citing only one definition of "operator" in determining the ordi-
nary meaning, even though opposing definitions existed).
8o. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998).
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former sense as "primary" and dismisses the latter as "special."" His first argu-
ment in support of that conclusion is that "[t] he Oxford English Dictionary gives
as its first definition 'convey, originally by cart or wagon, hence in any vehicle, by
ship, on horseback, etc.' 82 The italicized emphasis on "first" is Justice Breyer's.
His opinion takes a similar tack in citing the 'first definition" in Webster's Third-
"move while supporting (as in a vehicle or in one's hands or arms)""-and the
'first definition" in the Random House Dictionary - "to take or support from one
place to another; convey; transport."84
Justice Breyer reinforces his reliance on sense ranking in his reference to the
personally bear sense of carry in the Oxford English Dictionary, noting that this is
the "twenty-sixth definition" in the dictionary." This is the threshold basis of
Justice Breyer's conclusion that "[tihe relevant linguistic fact[]" is "that the word
'carry' in its ordinary sense includes carrying in a car."86
Justice Breyer also turns to etymology, in asserting that "[t] he origin of the
word 'carries' explains why the first, or basic, meaning of the word 'carry' in-
cludes conveyance in a vehicle."8 7 Justice Breyer states that carry traces from
"Latin 'carum,' which means 'car' or 'cart,"' and from "Old French 'carier' and
late Latin 'carricare,' which meant to 'convey in a car.""' The precise premises of
Justice Breyer's analysis are left implicit. But the point seems clear: the etymol-
ogy of the verb carry confirms that the transport sense of the term is ordinary and
the personally bear sense is unusual.
This is problematic. If the ordinary meaning question in Muscarello is an em-
pirical question of frequency or prototype analysis, neither the dictionary nor
etymology is useful. The dictionaries typically cited by our courts (including
those cited by Justice Breyer) make no claims about the relative frequency of the
listed senses of a given word. 9 Many commonly used, unabridged dictionaries
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 919).
83. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 343 (1986)).
84. Id. (quoting THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE - UNABRDIGED 319
(2d ed. 1987)).
85. Id. at 130 (citing 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 921).
86. Id. at 131.
87. Id. at 128 (citing THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 146 (Robert K. Barnhart ed.,
1988)).
88. Id. (first citing THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 146 (Robert K. Barnhart ed.,
1988); and then citing 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 919).
89. See Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-
Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 201o BYU L. REV. 1915, 1924-29 (discussing problems with




arrange their definitions based on evidence of historical usage. 0 Webster's Third
expressly disavows any attempt to establish a "hierarchy of importance" among
different senses and admits that " [s] ometimes an arbitrary arrangement or rear-
rangement is the only reasonable and expedient solution to the problems of or-
dering senses."
A similar problem undermines Justice Breyer's use of etymology. As the phi-
lologist Henry Sweet observed:
The meaning of a word in a given period of a given language is a matter
of usage, and the fact of its having had a certain meaning at some earlier
period or in some cognate language does not necessarily afford any help
in determining, and still less in remembering, its present meaning.92
If this were not true, then December would mean the tenth month, and an an-
thology would mean a bouquet of flowers." Yet, so common is the assumption
Dictionary of the English Language appears to be an exception. Its front matter states "a general
policy of putting the most frequently used meanings ... at the beginning of the entry, fol-
lowed by other senses in diminishing frequency of usage, with archaic, and obsolete senses
coming last'" RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE - UNABRIDGED, at viii
(2d ed. 1987). But we see grounds for skepticism of these sorts of claims. See infra notes 99-
102, 137-140 and accompanying text. When unabridged dictionaries assembled their citation
files, they were concerned about possible usage, not about making a representative, scientific
sample of the speech community. So, their claims about frequency and obsolescence are sus-
pect. Random House acknowledges that its sense ranking based on frequency holds only "gen-
erally." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE - UNABRIDGED, supra, at xxii.
Without more (and there is no more in this dictionary), the reader is left to guess about which
senses are ordered according to frequency and which ones follow some other organizing prin-
ciple.
go. See 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at xxix ("That sense is placed first
which was actually the earliest in the language: the others follow in order in which they have
arisen"); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 19a (1971) (indicating that the
order of senses is "historical," in that "the one known to have been first used in English is
entered first"; also stating that its "system of separating senses" is "only a lexical convenience,"
and not an "enduring hierarchy").
91. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note
90, at 17a.
92. HENRY SWEET, THE PRACTICAL STUDY OF LANGUAGES: A GUIDE FOR TEACHERS AND LEARNERS
88 (1900).
93. THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 29 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1995)
(providing the etymology of "anthology" as "1640, collection of the 'flowers' of verse (i.e.
small, choice poems) by various authors; borrowed, perhaps by influence of French anthologie,
from Greek anthologia flower-gathering (Anthos flower + Idgein gather)."); id. at 188 (providing
the etymology of "December" as "1122, borrowed from Old French decembre, from Latin De-
cember, from decem TEN, this being originally the tenth month of the early Roman calendar
(which began with March)").
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that a word's etymology shows its true meaning that the assumption has been
given a name: the "etymological fallacy."94 For this reason, Justice Breyer's anal-
ysis of the etymology of carry tells us nothing about its ordinary meaning.95
2. Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.
The Taniguchi opinion appears, at first glance, to employ dictionaries in a less
arbitrary way. Justice Alito does not turn to sense ranking or etymology. He pre-
sents an informal "survey" of dictionary definitions, asserting that "only a hand-
ful" of dictionaries include the written translator sense of interpreter, but "all" of
them speak of the oral translator sense. 96 And he says that the "sense divider[s]"
in the cited dictionaries confirm the Court's holding in designating the oral trans-
lator notion as one that is "especially" indicated and flagging the written translator
sense as "obsolete."9
Yet Justice Alito's approach is still problematic. The "survey" of dictionaries
is far from systematic. Justice Alito presents his own set of preferred dictionaries.
And within the cited dictionaries, the Court sometimes cites a definition of the
noun interpreter and sometimes cites a definition of the verb interpret. We cannot
tell from the opinion whether the written translator sense of interpreter is less often
listed in a real "survey" of dictionaries because we are not presented with an ac-
tual survey of dictionaries. We have only the definitions that Justice Alito has
presented for our review.98
94. SWEET, supra note 92, at 88; see also RANDOLPH QUIRK, STYLE AND COMMUNICATION IN THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 86 (1982) (characterizing as "one of the most pernicious of popular idjes
fixes" the notion that a word's etymology "gives you the 'real' meaning").
95. It is also worth noting that neither the ordinary legislator nor the ordinary citizen are likely to
have a working knowledge of the etymology of most words. Interpreting a statute according
to a long-lost meaning that neither the drafter nor the citizen is aware of seems a far cry from
searching for ordinary meaning.
96. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 568-69 (2012).
97. Id. at 568-69; see id. at 567-68 & n.2 (noting that the Concise Oxford Dictionary of CurrentEng-
lish, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the World Book Dictionary, and Cassell's Eng-
lish Dictionary designate the oral translator meaning as "especially" indicated); id. at 569 (not-
ing that the Oxford English Dictionary "designated [the written translator] meaning as
obsolete").
g8. Even a documented survey of every known dictionary might not be sufficient, moreover, for
reasons explained below. See infra notes 99-102, 137-140 and accompanying text. Dictionaries
are not trying to show ordinary meaning. But even if they were, the methods that they use to
sample language use don't create a reliable sample -aggregating dictionaries isn't going to




Justice Alito's sense dividers are also insufficient. First, not all dictionaries
designate written translator as obsolete or oral translator as special. At least one
definition mentioned in the majority opinion explicitly encompasses the written
sense of the term, without any indication of obsolescence."
Second, sense dividers are not reliable measures. Dictionaries tell us very lit-
tle about the basis for the "obsolete" sense designation. Ultimately, such a des-
ignation must be made on the basis of some underlying data that is unavailable
to the reader of the dictionary. So the "obsolete" designation tells us only that
the lexicographers who compiled the dictionary in question deemed a particular
sense to no longer be in use; but, without more, such designation gives us only
the opinion of those lexicographers and not a hard basis for an empirical conclu-
sion.100
An "especially" designation may be even more unreliable. Such a designation
suffers from all of the problems inherent in the "obsolete" designation, and it
also masks another deficiency, going to the arbitrariness of the distinction be-
tween two senses listed in a dictionary (described further below). The fact that
a given sense, or subsense, of a term is a special application of another highlights
the interrelationship between the two senses.o0 It suggests that the two senses
are not highly distinct from each other, but instead are exemplars or prototypes
of a broader category. That is what the Webster's definition cited in Taniguchi
seems to convey. The cited Webster's Third definition of interpreter is 'one that
translates; esp: a person who translates orally for parties conversing in different
tongues."102 This is an indication that the lexicographers who formulated this
definition for Webster's viewed the especially designated notion not as a separate
sense but as an exemplar of it-perhaps a common, prototypical example.
For these reasons the Taniguchi opinion also employs inadequate tools of
measurement. Justice Alito's "survey" and sense designations seem more sophis-
ticated, but ultimately they are also poor tools for assessing empirical questions
of ordinary meaning.
99. Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 567 (citing Interpreter, BALLENTINE'S LAWDICTIONARY 655 (3d ed. 1969)
(defining "interpreter" as " [o]ne who interprets, particularly one who interprets words writ-
ten or spoken in a foreign language")).
ioo. See DOUGLAS BIBER ET AL., CORPUs LINGUISTICS: INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND
USE 22 (1998) (observing that "citation slips" used by lexicographers represent only those
contexts "that [human] readers happen to notice").
101. See infra Part III.
102. Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 567-68 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1182 (1976)).
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3. United States v. Costello
Judge Posner rejects a dictionary-based approach to ordinary meaning in
Costello. He rightly notes that " [d] ictionary definitions are acontextual, whereas
the meaning of sentences depends critically on context, including all sorts of
background understandings."' 0 ' And for that reason, Judge Posner turns to
Google to get a "rough index of the frequency of [harboring's] use."104 This ap-
proach is innovative. But it is far from perfect.
Google might seem to be a good source for data-driven analysis of language
usage. "The World Wide Web is enormous, free, immediately available, and
largely linguistic." 0 And it is "appealing to use the Web as a data source" be-
cause "language analysis and generation benefit from big data."106 Google has
low entry costs, moreover. Even the most Luddite lawyer or judge is likely to be
able to perform a basic Google search. Yet we still see a range of problems in
Judge Posner's approach.
First is the black box of the Google algorithm. Google searches "are sorted
according to a complex and unknown algorithm (with full listings of all results
usually not permitted) so we do not know what biases are being introduced." 0
Google returns can vary by geography, by time of day, and from day to day.108
Google search results are thus rather unscientific, if we understand good science
as including replicability.
Second are problems with the Google search engine: the fact that it does not
allow us to search only for verb forms of harbor and that it will not allow us to
look at a particular speech community or period of time (only contemporary web
pages, even if their content was first published in the past). If we are interested
in knowing the ordinary use of harbor as a verb among ordinary English speakers
at the time of the enactment of the statute at issue (1917), Google cannot give us
that kind of parsed data.
In light of these search engine problems, Judge Posner formulated his own
set of search terms - comparing hit counts for phrases like "harboring fugitives"
103. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7 th Cir. 2012).
104. Id.
105. Adam Kilgarriff, Googleology Is Bad Science, 33 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 147, 147 (2007)
(discussing the limitations of Google as a corpus).
1o6. Id.





and "harboring guests."' But this innovation introduces a third set of prob-
lems: Judge Posner gives no basis for his chosen set of search terms, and the
terms he chose seem likely to affect the outcome.
Finally, even setting aside the problems discussed above, the hit counts that
Judge Posner relies on may not be indicative of ordinariness in the sense of fre-
quency of usage. Judge Posner implies that relative hit counts are an indication
of frequency of usage in our ordinary language. But that may not hold. Google
hit counts are based on the total number of web pages, not the total number of
occurrences of a given phrase."1 0 A single web page may have tens, hundreds, or
thousands of uses of an individual word or phrase that would only register in a
Google search as a single hit. So hit counts may not be a reliable indication of
ordinariness, even if we could overcome the other problems identified here.
We think Judge Posner was onto something in seeking an empirical method
of measurement, but we also think his Google search was inadequate.
II. THEORIZING ORDINARY MEANING
The deficiencies in the courts' approaches to ordinary meaning are also re-
flected in legal scholarship. Here we outline some of the approaches to ordinary
meaning reflected in the scholarly literature, in an attempt to expand on the
themes discussed in Part I.
Legal scholarship posits a range of conceptions of ordinary meaning. Profes-
sor Richard Fallon's catalog is perhaps the most extensive. He speaks of the "se-
mantic" or "literal" meaning of the words of the law; the "contextual" meaning
informed by "shared presuppositions" of speakers and listeners (which we take
to align with Sunstein's notion of "public meaning""' and Baude and Sachs's
idea of the "reader's understanding"1 12 ); the "intended meaning" of the law-
maker; the "reasonable" or "imputed" meaning attributed to "hypothetical, rea-
sonable legislators"; and the "interpreted meaning" of laws in judicial prece-
dent.1 13
Not all of these conceptions of meaning are applicable to our analysis here.
Certainly there is a case for respecting statutory meaning embedded in judicial
precedent. If judges have deemed a statute to have a certain meaning in the past,
iog. Costello, 666 F.3 d at 1044.
n1o. Kilgarriff, supra note 105, at 147.
iii. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 198.
112. Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1090 (distinguishing the "author's intent" and the "reader's
understanding").
113. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1255-63.
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the law of interpretation - informed by principles of stare decisis - can (and
should) yield due deference to the "interpreted meaning" established by prece-
dent.1 14 But our reasons for respecting such meaning have nothing to do with
the rule of law premises behind the law's search for ordinary communicative con-
tent.
Fallon's notion of "reasonable" or "imputed" meaning is also, but less obvi-
ously, a conception of extra-ordinary meaning. This construct is related to the
"fair reading" method advanced by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner in Reading
Law.11s The fair reading inquiry is framed in objective-sounding terms - in a
search for "objectified intent."116 But on closer review this notion of meaning has
nothing to do with actual communicative content of the words of the law (or of
intentions attributable to lawmakers). It is an idealized, constructive inquiry
aimed at an impossibly well-informed legislator-one with "aptitude in lan-
guage, sound judgment, the suppression of personal preferences regarding the
outcome, and, with older texts, historical linguistic research"; "an ability to com-
prehend the purpose of the text, which is a vital part of its context," and to glean
it "only from the text itself"; and even an understanding of "a word's historical
associations acquired from recurrent patterns of past usage" and "a word's im-
mediate syntactic setting - that is, the words that surround it in a specific utter-
ance."
1 1 7
This notion of meaning has little or nothing to do with the actual meaning
intended by a legislator or understood by the public. We may well have reasons
to credit this sort of idealized, constructive meaning. But if we do, it will not be
because we think that any actual legislator is likely to have read the words of a
law and understood it in this "reasonable" way, much less that an ordinary mem-
ber of the public gleaned that understanding. It will be because we deemed other
policies - policies having nothing to do with vindicating linguistic meaning - to
be of greater significance. 1
114. See id. at 1251 (articulating stare decisis arguments in support of the law's acceptance of "in-
terpreted meaning").
115. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 428.
116. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in AMATTEROF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
117. Id. at 33.
118. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47,
48 (20o6) (stating that the "touchstone" of this approach to interpretation "is not the specific
thoughts in the heads of any particular historical people . . . but rather the hypothetical un-




That leaves, in Fallon's taxonomy, (a) semantic meaning, (b) contextual
meaning (public meaning or the reader's understanding), and (c) intended
meaning. Semantic meaning is meaning that the language of the law would have
"for someone operating solely with dictionary definitions, rules of grammar, and
other general propositions bearing on how the meaning of a sentence emerges
from the combination of its elements.""' Fallon attributes this sort of meaning
to a sort of "literalist" textualism, asserting that " [p] articipants in legal discourse
frequently assume or argue that a legal provision's semantic or literal meaning
determines its legal meaning."12 0
The point here is the notion that "literalist" textualism excludes nonsemantic
context. In contrasting his notion of "contextual" meaning, for example, Fallon
distinguishes "semantics, which is concerned with the context-independent
meaning of words, phrases, and sentences, and pragmatics, which involves the
meaning of utterances in particular contexts."12 1 Here he cites an example from
Reading Law: "Nail in a regulation governing beauty salons has a different mean-
ing from nail in a municipal building code."122 He also distinguishes semantic
meaning from "contextual meaning" because the latter is "framed by the shared
presuppositions of speakers and listeners." 1 2 3
We agree that judges often frame their discussion of ordinary meaning in
terms of literalist versus contextual meaning. But our theory of ordinary mean-
ing parts company with Fallon at his suggestion that what he calls the "semantic
meaning" of an utterance should be distinguished from its "contextual meaning,"
or that these two competing notions of meaning allow for a "choice among mul-
tiple candidates to supply legal or conversational meaning." 124
Whenever we engage in the act of communication-whenever a speaker
speaks and a hearer hears - our minds take in the relevant interpretative infor-
mation at once. We take account of the formal aspects of an utterance (its lexical,
syntactic, and semantic content), as well as the pragmatic (in the linguistic sense
of the term) aspects of the utterance (for example, the physical or social setting
in which it is uttered). We interpret an utterance as part of a community of
ig. Fallon, supra note 2, at 1245.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1246.
122. Id. (quoting ScAIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 20). We use the phrase "semantic meaning"
more specifically to refer to the formal linguistic features of an utterance (i.e., syntax and ar-
gument structures, semantic features, and functional roles), but we do not suggest that se-
mantic meaning can ever be derived with reference to pragmatics or the "meaning of utter-
ances in particular contexts."
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1266.
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speakers of a language (with shared linguistic conventions and a shared under-
standing of different linguistic registers), and we necessarily interpret the utter-
ance according to the shared linguistic conventions that exist at the time of the
utterance.
If we are to have a theory of ordinary meaning that tracks the way we actually
use and interpret language, we cannot artificially separate out formal and prag-
matic considerations. Literalist semantic meaning alone is not an indication of
ordinary communicative content. Real human beings do not derive meaning
from dictionary definitions and rules of grammar alone. Everyone takes nonse-
mantic context- pragmatics -into account in deriving meaning from lan-
guage.125 And for that reason we see no basis to credit semantic meaning without
consideration of pragmatic context.126 If no lawmaker would read the text that
is voted into law purely semantically- devoid of pragmatic context - then there
is no reason to credit that kind of meaning as a means of vindicating the intent
of a lawmaker. The same goes for the public governed by the law. If no one reads
125. As Lawrence Solum has noted:
The word "pragmatic" is ambiguous. In contemporary legal theory, "pragmatism"
refers to an antifoundationalist approach that is strongly associated with Judge
Richard A. Posner. Legal pragmatism is related to the philosophical pragmatism
that is associated with philosophers Professor John Dewey, Professor William
James, and Charles Sanders Peirce. As used in the philosophy of language and the-
oretical linguistics, pragmatics is a technical term with a contested and evolving
meaning.
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 286 n.58 (2017) (citations
omitted). Often in linguistics, pragmatics is used to refer to the study of specific linguistic
phenomena like conversational implicature or deixis. ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE:
AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 332-37, 355-94 (2d ed. 2004). But prag-
matics is also "sometimes defined as being concerned with the role or effects of context." See
Solum, supra, at 286 n.59. Unless otherwise specified, we use the term pragmatics in this paper
to refer to nonverbal context that may affect meaning.
126. As we will demonstrate below, a significant amount of contextual information may be derived
from corpus data. In this respect, the corpus can provide insight into the context of an utter-
ance. Yet there are some aspects of nonverbal context that are harder to derive from corpus
data. These include notions of contextual enrichment like implicature, impliciture, presuppo-
sition, and modulation. See Solum, supra note 125, at 288-91 (discussing types of contextual
enrichment). The use of linguistic corpora to analyze these linguistic phenomena has only
recently begun to be explored by linguists. See Christoph Riihlemann & Karin Aijmer, Intro-
duction: Corpus Pragmatics: Laying the Foundations, in CORPUs PRAGMATICS: A HANDBOOK 1, 1
(Karin Aijmer & Christoph Riihlemann eds., 2015) ("For a long time pragmatics and corpus
linguistics were regarded as 'parallel but often mutually exclusive.' However, in recent years





laws literally by pure semantics, we have no reason to protect reliance interests
or notice concerns rooted in that kind of understanding.
This does not mean that it is never worthwhile to consider the formal aspects
of an utterance. Humans do take verbal, semantic context into account in inter-
preting language. It is just that humans also take nonverbal, pragmatic context
into account. In developing a more robust theory of ordinary meaning, we think
it important to highlight each of these elements of context that might affect our
understanding - and to clarify the determinants of ordinary meaning that our
law might seek to measure.
Before we turn to that endeavor, however, we first finish our treatment of
Fallon's taxonomy by addressing "intended" meaning. Is the law's search for
meaning aimed at finding the "public" meaning inferred by a "reader" of the law
or a more private "intended" sense of a lawmaker? On this we agree with Baude
and Sachs. "There may be good reasons for a legal system to prefer" either public
meaning or intended meaning.127 And "neither has to win every time," because
the "right" answer "depends on our reasons" for the resort to ordinary meaning
"in the first place."128
Intended meaning is an appropriate construct to the extent we are aiming to
vindicate the preferences of lawmakers. This is a viable, distinct basis for credit-
ing ordinary meaning. We may say, as does Professor Larry Alexander, "that the
reason we should seek the actual authors' intended meaning is that the actual
authors possessed the legal authority to promulgate norms, and their texts just
are their communications of the norms they intended to promulgate."12 9 If that
is our premise for looking to the ordinary communicative content of the law then
we will certainly look to the intended meaning of lawmakers (informed by rele-
vant elements of context, as presented below). Even the reader, at least arguably,
would seek this meaning.3 o But if we are to seek the intended meaning of the
authors of the law, we must have some objective means of doing so.
127. Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at lo91.
128. Id. at 1090.
129. Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONsT. COMMENT. 139, 140 (2010).
130. See Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 540 (2013)
(asserting that "our job is to determine the uptake the legislator(s) intended us to have"). We
also agree with Professor Ryan D. Doerfler, however, that legislative intent is ultimately a fic-
tion-not only because "Congress is a 'they,' not an 'it,' or because "Members of Con-
gress ... share no ... intention to treat as authoritative the views of a statute's 'principal spon-
sors' or 'others who worked to secure enactment," but also because language must be
understood in light of context consisting of "information salient to both author and audience."
Ryan Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DuiEL.J. 979, 982-83 (2017). This
suggests that the line between intended meaning and public meaning is thin or perhaps non-
existent, a point we return to below. See infra Section III.C.1.
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There is also a case for the public or "reader's" understanding. This sort of
meaning makes sense to the extent we are seeking to vindicate the notice ra-
tionale for the "standard picture" -the protection of reliance interests and the
avoidance of unfair surprise."' Enforcing "hard-to-find intentions" of lawmak-
ers "would make the law unpredictable or arbitrary."13 So to the extent our
search for ordinary meaning is aimed at protecting these interests, we should
seek to assess the public's understanding of the law at the time it was passed.
In summary, before framing the theory of meaning in a manner that may
allow us to measure it, we must first delineate the components of such meaning.
At a broad level, those components encompass semantic meaning and pragmatic
meaning. To assess meaning, linguists would tell us that we must also take into
account the relevant speech community (whose meaning?) and the relevant
timeframe (meaning as of when?). We explore each of these components below.
A. Semantic Meaning
Semantic meaning encompasses several components: lexicography, syntax,
and semantics.
1. Lexicography
The search for "semantic" meaning often distills to a question of word sense.
In Muscarello, Taniguchi, and Costello, for example, the courts were considering a
problem of competing word senses - senses numbered separately from each
other in the cited dictionaries.
Judges tend to assume that a dictionary's division of senses (by numbers and
letters) represents an immutable linguistic fact about the universe. We tend to
"ignore the fact," as Professor Larry Solan has put it, "that someone sat there and
wrote the dictionary, and we speak as though there were only one dictionary,
131. See Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REv. 89, 102 (arguing that "the case for textualism" is in part "[t]he
claim . . . that if legal rules are embedded in publicly available texts, affected persons will be
able to know, understand, and comply with those rules .... [T]he fair notice argument
for textualism in statutory interpretation presupposes, and seeks to ensure the full benefit of,
a shift from the common law to statutes"); Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REv.
542, 542 (2009) ("Perhaps the most intuitive and straightforward argument for textualism is
that it promotes fair notice of the law."); see also SCALIA, supra note 116, at 17 (asserting that it
is "incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have
the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the law-
giver promulgated").




whose lexicographer got all the definitions 'right' in some sense that defies anal-
ysis.""' But that is not the case. Dictionaries may differ sharply in the number
of senses they assign to a given term or in the divider they use to distinguish
senses. "And human beings, try as they may, bring their prejudices and biases
into the dictionaries they make."134
The question of "what is a word sense" turns out to be a very challenging
one in lexical semantics. Linguists and lexicographers lack "decisive criteria for
defining word senses and clearly discriminating between them."' And linguists
also acknowledge that the sense distinctions reflected in dictionaries are "more
of a descriptive device rather than a claim about psycholinguistic reality."136
In traditional lexicography, words are defined first by determining the class
of things to which they belong (their genus) and second by distinguishing them
from all other things in their class (their species)."' Words are then divided into
senses based on a variety of factors, including their part of speech, pronuncia-
tion, inflection, etymology, and shades of meaning.' This approach to defining
words and dividing them into senses can be highly impressionistic and has a
number of limitations. There is no agreed-upon formula for sense division-
some lexicographers make very fine-grained distinctions between senses (they
are sometimes called splitters), while others tend to make broader, more coarse-
grained distinctions (they are sometimes called lumpers)."' Moreover, the cita-
tion or quotation files from which many dictionaries are derived were collected
without the benefit of modern sampling methods. Accordingly, these files cannot
be relied upon for information about the frequency of a given word or word
sense. 140
133. Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50, 50 (1993) ("[O]ur soci-
ety's reverence for dictionaries is not driven by the latest discoveries in psycholinguistic re-
search. Rather, it is deeply embedded in our culture.").
134. JONATHAN GREEN, CHASING THE SUN: DICTIONARY MAKERS AND THE DICTIONARIES THEY
MADE Xiv (1996).
135. Nikola Dobri6, The Predictive Power of the (Micro)Context Revisited-Behavioral Profiling and
Word Sense Disambiguation, 57 ZBORNIKMATICE SRPSKEZAFILOLOGIJU ILINGVISTIKU77 (2014).
136. Stefan Th. Gries, Polysemy, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 482 (Ewa Dabrowska &
Dagmar Divjak eds., 2015); see also Dylan Glynn, Polysemy and Synonymy: Cognitive Theory and
Corpus Method, in CORPUS METHODS FOR SEMANTICS: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN POLYSEMY
AND SYNONYMY 7, 1o (Dylan Glynn & Justyna A. Robinson eds., 2014).
137. SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 153 (2d ed. 2014).
138. Bo SVENSfN, PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF DICTIONARY-MAKING
204- 05 (John Sykes & Kerstin Schofield trans., 1993).
139. Elizabeth Walter, Using Corpora To Write Dictionaries, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF COR-
PUs LINGUISTICS 433-34 (Ann O'Keeffe & Michael McCarthy eds., 2010).
140. LANDAU, supra note 137, at 153.
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Contemporary lexicographers have moved past relying on citation files alone
and have begun to rely on electronic "corpora" - large bodies or databases of nat-
urally occurring language - to gather linguistic data.141 Corpus analysis has al-
lowed lexicographers to address the problem of sense division with greater gran-
ularity. Lexicographers can now view a more complete range of potential uses of
a given word and collect statistical information about the likelihood of a given
word appearing in a particular semantic environment.14 2
Linguistic corpora allow us to make observations about the way that lan-
guage is (and was) used through a less arbitrary and more readily measurable
methodology than resort to dictionaries. And because language is the output of
the mind, it is reasonable to assume that we can learn something about the way
the mind perceives language by examining the way language is used in natural
language environments. As mentioned above, there may be other ways to meas-
ure the way that language utterances are perceived. 143 Linguists in other linguis-
tic disciplines use a variety of experimental methods to account for human per-
ception of sense and meaning. But for now, our focus is on corpus linguistic
analysis.
The challenge of sense division can be illustrated by reference to competing
senses of carry in Muscarello or the alternative notions of interpreter in Taniguchi.
Lexicographers may disagree about where to draw the lines between senses of
these terms, or whether the two alternatives are distinct from each other.144 But
if the question of the dividing line is in some sense arbitrary and not reflective of
the way in which the mind perceives and interprets language, then we ought to
seek to measure - to the extent it is possible to measure - whether the mind per-
ceives a sense distinction between two occurrences of the same word, rather than
relying on the sense-divisions in the dictionaries before us.
This problem is most acute as to two senses that are viewed as closely related
to each other. The two notions of interpreter in Taniguchi are illustrative. We can
141. See, e.g., OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH xi (3d ed. 2010) ("The general principle on which
the senses in the Oxford Dictionary of English are organized is that each word or part of
speech has at least one core sense or core meaning, to which a number of subsenses may be
attached.... Core meanings represent typical, central uses of the word in question in modem
standard English, as established by analysis of the Oxford English Corpus and our other lan-
guage databases."). Below we will discuss in greater detail the nature of the language databases
in question and why the language in those databases is properly characterized as "naturally
occurring."
142. JOHN LYONS, LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 80 (1995) (noting that another way
to think about word senses is as "the set, or network, of sense-relations that hold between [an
expression] and other expressions of the same language").
143. See supra note 22.
144. See BIBERET AL., supra note loo, at 40 (documenting the differences in the definition and sense




find distinct definitions encompassing oral translator and written translator. But
that may not tell us how these two senses are perceived, or that one sense would
be viewed as excluding the other. The notion of oral translator could simply be
perceived as a more common "prototype" of the more general notion of "one who
translates." The written translator idea could certainly be viewed as an atypical ex-
ample. That may be all that dictionaries are telling us by indicating that written
translator is "obsolete." And if so, that sort of obsolescence would not tell us that
an ordinary person would not understand text providing for compensation for
an interpreter to cover a written translator.
A dodo, after all, is an obsolete bird. But it is still a bird. And a person who
happened to discover a remaining dodo on a remote island would certainly be
understood to be in possession of a bird. Such a person would be covered, for
example, by the terms of a rental agreement prohibiting tenants to keep "dogs,
cats, birds, or other pets" in their apartments. If you are found in possession of
a caged dodo, you are not likely to escape the wrath of the landlord by insisting
that a dodo is an "obsolete" sort of a bird.
2. Syntactic and Semantic Context
The need to consider context is a staple element of the judicial inquiry into
ordinary meaning. Courts often reference the notion of context when they in-
voke the ordinary meaning canon.145 Yet they rarely say what they mean by con-
text. Linguistic theory can help identify which elements of context may matter,
and thereby offer some discipline for what has been haphazard judicial practice.
Context can be viewed as encompassing both verbal and non-verbal compo-
nents.14 6 The verbal context of a word or phrase in a statute includes its syntactic
and semantic environments. Syntax is a set of rules and principles that governs
sentence formation and determines which sentences will convey meaning to
145. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010) (observing that in the ordinary meaning
inquiry, "[u]ltimately, context determines meaning"); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "regular method for interpreting the meaning
of language in a statute" was to "first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual
context"); Braunstein v. Comm'r, 374 U.S. 65, 70 (1963) (defining the ordinary meaning of
"gain" in a particular context). We are referring to linguistic context, which is a somewhat
different concept than seeing if the statutory context precludes turning to ordinary meaning
altogether. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 152 (2007) ("In interpreting statutory
texts courts use the ordinary meaning of terms unless context requires a different result.").
146. Charles Goodwin & Alessandro Duranti, Rethinking Context: An Introduction, in RETHINKING
CONTEXT: LANGUAGEASAN INTERACTIVE PHENOMENON 1, 6-9 (Alessandro Duranti & Charles
Goodwin eds., 1992).
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members of the same speech community. 14 7 One aspect of syntax is argument
structure, a linguistic term of art that refers to the participants in the action of a
verb. 148 A transitive verb, like carry, has two arguments - the subject and the ob-
ject. If we are interested in examining the meaning of phrases like carries afire-
arm, we would look for phrases that have a similar argument structure. And
those arguments may affect our understanding of the meaning of carry.
Semantic context may also affect our perception of meaning. Semantics is the
study of meaning at the word or phrase level.149 Embedded within the words
and phrases we use are a number of concepts that are sometimes referred to as
the semantic features or semantic components of a word." 0 These features in-
clude concepts like number, animacy, gender, humanness, and concreteness (i.e.,
tangibleness)."' In semantic theory, words can also be understood with refer-
ence to their functional role. A word has an agentive function if it is an instigator
of the action of a verb, or an objective function if it is the entity that is affected by
the action of the verb. A word may also serve an instrumental function if it is a
force or object involved in, but not instigating, the action.152
An illustration of these linguistic concepts may be made by reference to the
Muscarello statute's requirement of a mandatory minimum sentence for "anyone
who . . . carries a firearm." Our understanding of anyone who carries afirearm is
informed by the syntactic arguments - with who as the subject and firearm as the
object of the verb. With respect to semantic features, we can characterize the rel-
evant subject of the statute in Muscarello as animate, human, and concrete. Simi-
larly, we can characterize the relevant object as inanimate, concrete, non-human,
and even weapon. With respect to functional roles, who performs the agentive
147. 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 487 (2d ed. 1989). Syntax is also the study of these rules and
principles. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 11 (1957) ("Syntax is the study of the
principles and processes by which sentences are constructed in particular languages.").
148. CRUSE, supra note 125, §§ 14.1-5, at 281-90 (3d. ed. 2011). An intransitive verb (fall, die, yawn)
has one argument- the subject. Id. § 14-4.1, at 283. A di-transitive verb (throw, send) has three
arguments - the subject, the direct object, and the indirect object. Id. § 14-4.3, at 287-88.
149. MICHAEL MORRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 152 (20o6) ("Seman-
tics is the attempt to give a systematic explanation of how the meaning of sentences depends
upon the meaning of their parts.").
150. JOHN I. SAEED, SEMANTICS 260, 265 ( 4 th ed. 2015).
151. Id.
152. Following Charles Fillmore, Alan Cruse lists a number of functional roles for words, including
agentive-the instigator of the action; instrumental-the force or object involved in the action
of the verb; dative/experiencer - the animate being affected by the action of the verb; factitive -
the result of the action of the verb; locative -location or spatial orientation of the verb; and
objective - the inanimate entity affected by the action of the verb. CRUSE, supra note 125, § 14.5,




function, instigating the action of carry, and firearm serves an objective function.
In the phrase anyone who carries afirearm in a car, car serves an instrumental func-
tion-it is involved in the action of the verb, but does not instigate it and does
not receive it.
By looking to the argument structure and semantic features of the relevant
statute, we are able to perform a more targeted search for language data to in-
form our inquiry into ordinary meaning. When we seek to measure language
usage, we may wish to limit our search to uses of the verb carry that share the
above-noted features - the syntax of a transitive verb, with the semantic features
of a human subject and a weapon object.5
Limiting our search in this way will also inform the utility of information
about frequency. We may find, for example, that the most frequent use of a given
word is in fact quite rare in the syntactic and semantic context that is most sim-
ilar to the statute. For example, we could find that the most common use of carry
is to carry on one's person, but that the more prevalent use is different in the con-
text of a human agent carrying an inanimate, weapon object -there, the carry in
a car meaning may be most prevalent. Thus, when we search for ordinary mean-
ing, we ought to be looking for the most common use of a given word in the
contexts that are most similar to that of the statute in question.
B. Pragmatic Meaning
The meaning of an utterance will not always be expressly communicated in
its semantic content. Non-verbal (pragmatic) contextual considerations will also
be taken into account.154 Such considerations may encompass the physical or so-
cial setting of an utterance, and even an inference about the intent of the
speaker.5 5
153. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
that the issue presented "is not 'carries' at large but 'carries a firearm'").
154. See CRUSE, supra note 125, at 347; Goodwin & Duranti, supra note 146, at 6-9. Pragmatics
includes concepts like conversational implicature, where the meaning of an utterance is
strongly implied but not expressly stated - as where a spouse who says "there sure are a lot of
dishes in the sink" is not just making an observation about the state of the universe but is
reminding somebody about whose turn it is to do the dishes.
155. Careful scholars have recognized this point, and they have identified it as a basis for conclud-
ing that the space between textualism and intentionalism is small. See SCAIA, supra note 116,
at 144 (conceding that "what the text would reasonably be understood to mean" and "what it
was intended to mean" are concepts that "chase one another back and forth to some extent,
since the import of language depends upon its context, which includes the occasion for, and
hence the evident purpose of, its utterance"); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That
English You're Speaking?": Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
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Judge Richard Posner's "Keep off the grass" problem is a good illustration.
As Posner notes, a sign in a park that says "'Keep off the grass' is not properly
interpreted to forbid the grounds crew to cut the grass." 5 6 Our understanding
of the meaning of this sign is informed by more than just its semantic and syn-
tactic content. We understand it in light of its pragmatic context, which includes
inferences about the place and manner of the utterance and presumed intentions
of the speaker.
Pragmatic considerations are of relevance to any attempt to assess the ordi-
nary meaning of a statutory phrase. An utterance that merely describes a person
carrying a firearm might be understood to convey one ordinary meaning. But a
criminal prohibition- more precisely, a requirement of a mandatory minimum
criminal sentence - may be understood differently. At least that is possible, and
we may need to take such context into account in assessing ordinary meaning.
Pragmatic context may also inform the utility of frequency information, just
as semantic and syntactic considerations do. In searching for the ordinary mean-
ing of a given word, we might focus our search for the most frequent uses of the
word that occur in contexts that share similar physical or social features to those
represented in the statute. The more frequently a given use of a word occurs in
circumstances that reflect a physical and social setting similar to that of the stat-
ute, the more confidence we should have that the use in question is the ordinary
meaning of the word in that context.
C. Meaning as of When?
Human language is in a constant state of change."' But it does not change
at a predictable rate.' Nor do different linguistic features change at the same
REv. 967, 979 (2004) ("[T]he commonplace truth that all understandings of texts are con-
textual just demonstrates that all texts qua texts acquire their meaning from the presumed
intentions of their authors.").
156. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 40 (2010) ("[Pragmatism] refers to basing
judgments (legal or otherwise) on consequences, rather than on deduction from premises in
the manner of syllogism.").
157. JOHN LYONS, INTRODUCTION TO THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 43 (1968) ("All languages are sub-
ject to constant change. This is an empirical fact . . . . All living languages . . . are of their
nature efficient and viable systems of communication serving the different and multifarious
social needs of the communities that use them. As these needs change, languages will tend to
change to meet the new conditions.").
158. TERRY CROWLEY & CLAIRE BOWERN, AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS 149-51




time."' A compelling theory of ordinary meaning must take account of this var-
iation and allow us to examine the linguistic norms prevailing at different his-
torical periods.
Lawyers and judges are used to thinking about timeframe in constitutional
interpretation. There we often acknowledge that original meaning may differ
from modern meaning. But we often ignore the problem in statutory interpreta-
tion. Or sometimes we just assume it away. In Costello, for example, Judge Posner
noted that the harboring an alien statute was enacted in 1917, but looked for mod-
ern data as to the ordinary sense of the verb harbor.16 0 Perhaps he did so out of
convemence or necessity, given that his Google search framework would not
have allowed historical analysis. But his stated reason reflected the reality of
much litigation over statutory interpretation: the parties simply didn't bother to
consider the possibility that the term harbor may have evolved over time - both
sides presented dictionary definitions from modern times - so Judge Posner ap-
pears to have concluded that this gave him license to do the same thing.
That phenomenon is sometimes reflected in our theory of statutory interpre-
tation. At least a few courts have looked to the ordinary meaning of a statute as
of the time it was enacted.161 That approach seems appropriate to the extent we are
seeking "intended" meaning. This is the point of the originalists who argue for
the vindication of intended original meaning -that the "ratifiers of the Consti-
tution ... are the persons with authority to make and change constitutional
norms," and thus that contemporary interpreters (and citizens) are bound by
their views.162 If we "'interpret' the Constitution as if it had been authored by
someone other than its ratifiers," these originalists argue, we are "mak[ing] con-
stitutional 'law' without authority to do so."1 6 3 The same point can be made as
to statutes. If intended meaning is the relevant construct, we must be bound by
meaning as of the time of the statute's initial enactment. Otherwise, we are vin-
dicating intentions at other times and by other people.
The "public" meaning construct could encompass either contemporary or
historical meaning. If we are seeking to protect contemporary reliance interests
and fair notice, we should arguably be seeking contemporary (not historical) ev-
idence of ordinary meaning. "Normal" English speakers are guided by their con-
159- Id.
16o. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043-44 ( 7 th Cir. 2012).
161. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 388 (2009); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Perez, 778 F.3 d 507,
512 (6th Cir. 2015); State Bd. of Nursing v. Ruebke, 913 P.2d 142, 157 (Kan. 1996); State v.
Ziska, 334 P.3d 964, 967 (Or. 2014).
162. Alexander, supra note 129, at 141.
163. Id.
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temporary understanding, and they lack a sophisticated understanding of his-
torical usage. So if we are trying to protect those interests we should arguably be
seeking contemporary public meaning. But that is not the only way to think
about public meaning. The premises of originalism can also be understood to
seek to protect original public meaning - to preserve the public meaning fixed at
the time of adoption or ratification.
Frequency considerations may also be applied to theories of both the "in-
tended meaning" and "public meaning" of historical texts. If we are looking for
what the ratifiers of the Constitution intended a particular word to mean, we
might search for the most common way that word was used in texts drafted by
the ratifiers (taking into account similarities in syntactic, semantic, and prag-
matic context). If, on the other hand, we are looking for the original public
meaning of a word or phrase in the Constitutional text, we might look to how
that word was most commonly used by the public at large in similar contexts.
If we seek to measure historical meaning, how can we do so? One common
means of assessing historical ordinary meaning is to consult an old dictionary.
That is an approach that courts often take in seeking the original meaning of the
Constitution. But that practice is fraught with all of the difficulties highlighted
above as to contemporary dictionaries: historical dictionaries, just like their con-
temporary peers, cannot yield reliable information about which of various senses
is more ordinary. Indeed, the problems are compounded for historical dictionar-
ies.164
This is not to say that historical dictionaries do not have value. Historical
dictionaries can be useful for defining unknown terms and attesting contested
uses. 165 But we ought to regard them with skepticism when they are offered as
evidence of "ordinary" or "original" meaning.
164. See Rickie Sonpal, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2209-10
(2003) ("Supreme Court Justices are sometimes very scrupulous about choosing the diction-
ary and edition with a publication date close to the date the statute was enacted; yet, this
practice is often of deceptively limited value. This practice is of even less value when old dic-
tionaries are used because some popular older dictionaries were not only reprinted but even
appeared in new editions without any substantive change to the body of the dictionary....
Accordingly, judges who carefully choose the printing or edition of an old dictionary that is
most closely contemporary with the statute risk relying on a dictionary the substance of which
far antecedes the statute." (footnotes omitted)).
165. The same is true for general-use, unabridged dictionaries. They can be useful for defining





Our understanding of meaning is also shaped by our speech community-
the group of people with whom we share a set of linguistic norms, conventions,
and expectations about linguistic behavior.166 Meaning may also vary across dif-
ferent linguistic registers - varieties of texts, ranging from spoken communica-
tions, to newspapers, academic prose, or even congressional committee reports
that tend to share linguistic features. Our theory of ordinary meaning must be
able to account for the speech community we are evaluating and address the dif-
ferences in various linguistic registers.
Limiting our search to a given speech community or register will have an
important effect on the usefulness of information about frequency. It would not
be unusual to find that a use of a word that is common in one speech community
or register is quite rare in another. By limiting a search for ordinary meaning to
the relevant speech community and register in question, we can have greater
confidence that information about the frequency of use of a given word is telling
us something useful about ordinary meaning.
The choice between "public" meaning and "intended" meaning may have
implications for our identification of the relevant speech community. The pub-
lic-meaning construct seems to dictate a speech community consisting of a broad
cross-section of the public. The intended-meaning inquiry, on the other hand,
could at least arguably point to a more limited community. Members of Congress
are generally not common, ordinary people and their usage of certain words may
not be colloquial. So, if our search for ordinary meaning is aimed at deriving
intended meaning, we may wish to assess the usage or understanding of a more
sophisticated group of English speakers. We may also wish to take into account
iSS. See, e.g., MARCYLIENA H. MORGAN, SPEECH COMMUNITIES: KEY TOPICS IN LINGUISTIC AN-
THROPOLOGY 1 (2014) ("Speech communities are groups that share values and attitudes about
language use, varieties and practices. These communities develop through prolonged inter-
action among those who operate within these shared and recognized beliefs and value systems
regarding forms and styles of communication."); Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:
Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1154 (1983) (defining speech commu-
nity as the "group of people who share a common language (or sublanguage) and thus a com-
mon culture (or subculture), which in turn defines the context that conditions the utterances
that occur within it" (footnote omitted)); John Sinclair, Meaning in the Framework of Corpus
Linguistics, 2o LEXICOGRAPHICA 20, 22 (2004) ("The differences in interpretation between
members of a speech community are small and they do not interfere much with normal com-
munication."); Kamal K. Sridhar, Societal Multilingualism, in SOCIOLINGUISTICS AND LAN-
GUAGE TEACHING 47, 49 (Sandra Lee McKay & Nancy H. Hornberger eds., 1996) ("A con-
glomeration of individuals who share the[] same norms about communication is referred to
as a speech community. A speech community is defined as a community sharing a knowledge
of the rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech.").
827
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the pragmatic consideration that the more formal nature of legal language can
affect human understanding of meaning.16 7
III. OPERATIONALIZING ORDINARY MEANING
The above sets the stage for a more careful formulation of the law's assess-
ment of the ordinary communicative content of the language of the law. A com-
pelling theory of ordinary meaning recognizes that we may choose to measure
either public meaning or intended meaning. And however we choose to frame
the inquiry, we should account for all of the relevant semantic, pragmatic, tem-
poral, and speech-community considerations.
That leaves the question of measurement or operationalization. We propose
the use of tools employed in corpus linguistics. Corpus linguistics is an empirical
approach 68 to the study of language that involves large, electronic databases of
text known as corpora (the plural of corpus).16 9 A corpus is a body or database
of naturally occurring language.17 0 Corpus linguists draw inferences about lan-
guage from data gleaned from "real-world" language in its natural habitat -in
books, magazines, newspapers, and even transcripts of spoken language."' The
167. But see Doerfler, supra note 130, at 983-84 (articulating a "conversation" model of "fictionalist"
legislative intent in which "[a]n interpreter occupies the position of conversational partici-
pant, hearing statements directed at her and other participants" and credits "information sa-
lient both to members of Congress and to citizens").
iss. PAUL BAKERET AL., A GLOSSARY OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 65 (20o6) ("In linguistics, empiri-
cism is the idea that the best way to find out about how language works is by analysing real
examples of language as it is actually used. Corpus linguistics is therefore a strongly empirical
methodology"); TONY McENERY & ANDREw HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE 49 (2012) ("Empiricism lies at the core of corpus linguistics . . .
16g. See McENERY & HARDIE, supra note 168, at 1-3.
170. See Douglas Biber, Corpus-Based and Corpus-Driven Analyses of Language Variation and Use, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTICANALYSIS 159,159 (Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog eds.,
2010) ("Corpus linguistics is a research approach that has developed over the past several
decades to support empirical investigations of language variation and use, resulting in re-
search findings that have much greater generalizability and validity than would otherwise be
feasible . . . . [I] t utilizes a large and principled collection of natural texts, known as a 'corpus,'
as the basis for analysis . . . .").
171. Id. at 16o-61 ("[Corpus linguistics] depends on both quantitative and qualitative analytical
techniques .... [T]he major contribution of corpus linguistics is to document the existence
of linguistic constructs that are not recognized by current linguistic theories. Research of this
type -referred to as a 'corpus-driven' approach -identifies strong tendencies for words and
grammatical constructions to pattern together in particular ways, while other theoretically
possible combinations rarely occur . . .. [C]orpus-based research investigates the patterns of




defining characteristic of corpus linguistics is "the claim that it is possible to ac-
tually 'represent' a domain of language use with a corpus of texts, and possible
to empirically describe linguistic patterns of use through analysis of that cor-
pus."172 Through corpus analysis we can test our hypotheses about language
through rigorous experimentation with observable and quantifiable data. And
the results of a corpus-based conclusion will be replicable and falsifiable."'
Corpus data can tell us the relative frequency of different senses of vehicle (or
of carrying a firearm, of interpreter, or of harboring an alien) in naturally occurring
language.174 And if the search for ordinary meaning entails analyzing the relative
frequency of competing senses of a given term, then corpus linguistics seems the
most promising tool. 75
Corpus data can also help us resolve different types of linguistic uncertainty
in the interpretation of legal texts.176 We can use corpus data to address ques-
tions of vagueness, where "a word or phrase has borderline cases.""' The scope
include casual face-to-face conversation, service encounters, lectures, sermons, political de-
bates, etc.; and, in writing, these include e-mail messages, text-messaging, newspaper edito-
rials, academic research articles, etc." (citation omitted)).
172. DOUGLAS BIBER & RANDI REPPEN, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH CORPUS LINGUIS-
TICS 1 (2015).
173. See McENERY & HARDIE, supra note 168, at 66 ("As a key goal of corpus linguistics is to aim
for replicability of results, data creators have an important duty to discharge in ensuring that
the data they produce is made available to analysts in the future.").
174. Assuming, of course, the corpora used are properly constructed such that they enable us to
make generalizations about a larger population. See generally Douglas Biber, Representativeness
in Corpus Design, 8 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 243 (1993) (addressing a number of
issues related to achieving "representativeness" in linguistic corpus design).
175. One problem in finding ordinary meaning is the problem of modulation, the idea that "a con-
ventional semantic meaning can be adjusted or modulated to fit the context-essentially, a
new meaning is created (sometimes on the spot) so that an old word is used in a new way."
Solum, supra note 125, at 290. It is possible that corpus data establishing the prevailing use of
a given word in a given period could also be used to triangulate instances of modulation. It is
similarly possible that historical corpus data could be used to trace circumstances in which
modulation resulted in new coinages with important legal implications. See id. (arguing that
the "Constitution contains a variety of modulations"). We do not address these phenomena
here, however.
176. See id. at 286 n.6o ("Lawyers sometimes use the words 'ambiguity' and 'vagueness' inter-
changeably to refer to a lack of clarity"); Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts
and Statutes, 79 CHI-ICENT L. REv. 859, 86o (2004) ("When discussing indeterminacy in
meaning, linguists and philosophers often distinguish between ambiguity and vagueness....
Legal writers, and judges in particular, use the word 'ambiguity' to refer to all kinds of inde-
terminacy, whatever their source. Because this Article focuses heavily on what judges say, I
will generally use the word ambiguity in this looser, legal sense.").
177. Solum, supra note 125, at 286.
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of the term vehicle in the no vehicles ordinance is perhaps an example of vague-
ness. We can also use corpus data to address questions of ambiguity, where a
word or phrase has more than one potential meaning in a given context.1 78 Mus-
carello seems to fit here; the choice between the competing senses of carry is
largely a question of ambiguity.
Such data can also inform our assessment of linguistic prototype.1 79 If the
corpus data reveal that most vehicles that we speak of are automobiles, or that
most instances of carrying a firearm involve bearing it on your person, we may
infer that those senses are more likely to be prototypical senses of the operative
terms.
Below we drill down further on the proposed means of measurement. First
we present linguistic tools and means of measuring the components of ordinary
meaning identified above. We then illustrate the utility of those tools by applying
them to the cases and examples discussed throughout the Article. We conclude
this Part with some observations about inferences that can be drawn from the
data about the ordinary meaning of vehicle, carry ajirearm, interpreter, and harbor.
A. Tools
Corpus linguistic tools can be employed to measure ordinary meaning as
conceptualized in this Article. Here we explore the range of available corpora and
the functionalities they encompass.
1. Varieties of Linguistic Corpora
Linguistic corpora come in a number of varieties, each tailored to suit the
needs of a particular set of empirical questions about language use. Corpora may
be general or special. A general corpus endeavors to represent the language used
by a broad (often national) speech community. Special corpora are limited to a
178. See id. (defining ambiguity as "cases in which a word or phrase has more than one sense.").
179. Intuitively, we might assume that frequency and prototype would map onto one another with
some precision, but this is not always the case. See John R. Taylor, Prototype Theory, in 1 SE-
MANTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE MEANING, 643, 649-50 (Claudia
Maienborn et al. eds., 2011) ("In response to the question 'where does prototypicality come
from?, many people are inclined to say that prototypes (or prototypical instances) are en-
countered more frequently than more marginal examples and that that is what makes them
prototypical. Although frequency of occurrence certainly may be a factor (our prototypical
vehicles are now somewhat different from those of ioo years ago, in consequence of changing




particular genre, register, or dialect. 10 There are monitor corpora that are contin-
uously updated with new texts in order to track contemporary language use, and
there are historical or sample corpora that reflect the language use of a particular
period. We will rely on both monitor and historical corpora in the analysis below.
Corpora may also be raw, tagged, or parsed. A raw corpus contains almost no
linguistic metadata (e.g., a .txt file containing the complete works of Shake-
speare would be a raw corpus). Tagged corpora typically contain metadata from
a grammatical "tagging" program that automatically marks each word with a
part of speech. A tagged corpus can dramatically improve corpus analysis by al-
lowing a researcher to look for all different forms of a single word in a single
search (e.g., a search for the verb carry would automatically include every verb
inflection, including carries, carrying, and carried) and to limit results to a partic-
ular part of speech (e.g., the verb harbor, not the noun harbor). This type of
search is called a lemmatized search- a search for the base form of a word that
reveals its permutations. Parsed corpora contain phrase-, clause-, or sentence-
level annotation, revealing the syntactic relationships among the words in the
corpus. While automated tagging is highly accurate, automated parsing is not.
Thus, parsed corpora tend to require a significant amount of human editing and
annotation, which increases the costs of their production dramatically. For that
reason, parsed corpora tend to be smaller than tagged corpora. The corpora we
rely on in the analysis below are tagged, but not parsed."'
2. Corpus Tools-Frequency, Collocation, and Key Word in Context
Linguistic corpora can perform a variety of tasks that cannot be performed
by human linguistic intuition alone. For example, as noted above, corpora can
be used to measure the statistical frequency of words and word senses in a given
speech community and over a given time period.182 Whether we regard the or-
dinary meaning of a given word to be the possible, common, or the most common
18o. For example, the Linguistic Data Consortium at the University of Pennsylvania produced a
corpus of recorded Egyptian Arabic telephone calls. See Alexandra Canavan et al., CALL-
HOME Egyptian Arabic Speech, LINGUISTIC DATA CONSORTIUM (1997), http://catalog.ldc
.upenn.edu/LDC97S45 [http://perma.cc/P6NQ-MUT5].
181. The corpora relied on in this paper were tagged by the Constituent Likelihood Automatic
Word-tagging System (CLAWS- 7 ) program. Mark Davies, The 385+ Million Word Corpus of
Contemporary American English (1990-2oo8+): Design, Architecture, and Linguistic Insights, 14
INT'LJ. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 159, 164 (2009).
182. TONY McENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 82 (2d ed.
2001).
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sense of that word in a given context, linguistic corpora allows us to determine
empirically where a contested sense of a term falls on that continuum.
Corpora can also show collocation, "which is the tendency of words to be bi-
ased in the way they co-occur."' As we have seen, words are often interpreted
according to the semantic environment in which they are found. A collocation
program can show the possible range of linguistic contexts in which a word typ-
ically appears and can provide useful information about the range of possible
meanings and sense divisions.184
Corpora also have a concordance or key word in context ("KWIC") function,
which allows their users to review a particular word or phrase in hundreds of
contexts, all on the same page of running text. This allows a corpus user to eval-
uate words in context systematically.
Commonly accepted canons of interpretation like ejusdem generis and noscitur
a sociis already counsel legal interpreters to look for meaning in the surrounding
linguistic context of an utterance - to know a word by the company it keeps."'
The data made available through a linguistic corpus allows one to make such
inquiries systematically, and to gain meaningful and quantifiable insight about
the range of possible uses of a word and the frequency of its different senses.18 6
3. Representing Speech Community and Register in a Corpus
Linguistic corpora can be built from the ground up using text or speech from
any given speech community or register. As Professor Larry Solan has noted:
When the legal system decides to rely on the ordinary meaning of a word,
it must also determine which interpretive community's understanding it
wishes to adopt. This choice is made tacitly in legal analysis, but becomes
overt when the analysis involves linguistic corpora because the software
displays the issue on a screen in front of the researcher. 187
183. SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS 68 (2002); see also John R. Firth, A Syn-
opsis ofLinguistic Theory, 1930-1955, in STUDIES IN LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 1, 14 (1957) ("Colloca-
tions are actual words in habitual company.").
184. HUNSTON, supra note 183, at 69.
185. ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 76-78 (discussing the ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis canons).
186. Early discussions of collocation analysis used language very similar to the noscitur a sociis
canon. See, e.g., Firth, supra note 183, at 11 ("You shall know a word by the company it
keeps!").




In this Article we rely on a pair of corpora of standard written American Eng-
lish (one contemporary and one historical). But a corpus can be constructed to
represent the language use of a wide variety of speech communities or regis-
ters.188
One possibility worth highlighting is that of a distinct legal corpus. Some of
the language of the law, of course, is written in a distinct legal dialect. 19 Where
a given term is thought to be a legal term of art, a legal corpus could be built to
analyze its meaning in the legal vernacular. Such a corpus could be employed to
compare the ordinary sense of a given term and its legal term-of-art usage.
4. Representing Historical Language Use
Finally, a linguistic corpus can be built from texts representing the language
use from any period in history. To the extent our understanding of ordinary
meaning should be informed by the linguistic norms and conventions prevailing
at the time that a given legal text was drafted, corpus linguistics can provide
powerful evidence of historic language use.
5. The BYU Corpora
Below we will taclde the interpretive problems posed by the Muscarello,
Taniguchi, and Costello cases using data from two linguistic corpora: the News
on the Web ("NOW") Corpus and the Corpus of Historical American English
("COHA"), both developed at Brigham Young University and referred to here
as the BYU Corpora. Here we outline the parameters of each corpus and high-
light their differences.
a. NOW Corpus
The NOW Corpus is a database of "5.2 billion words of data from web-based
newspapers and magazines from 2010 to the present time."o90 It is a monitor cor-
pus that "grows by about 5-6 million words of data each day (from about o,ooo
188. While corpora vary in size and sophistication, anyone can build a corpus using freely available
software like AntCorGen. See AntCorGen, LAURENCE ANTHONY'S WEBSITE, http://www
.1aurenceanthony.net/software/antcorgen [http://perma.cc/NJV9- 5JvP].
189. See generally McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 4, at 4 (asserting that the Constitution is
written in the "language of the law," not ordinary English).
190. NOW Corpus (News on the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now [http://perma.cc/UTD2
-BC86].
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new articles), or about 15o million words each month."'9 The NOW Corpus
downloads content every night from dozens of websites listed on Google News,
using an automated software program.192 These texts are then automatically
tagged and lemmatized (adding part-of-speech metadata to each word) and in-
tegrated into the existing corpus.193 Because of this extraordinary rate of growth,
the NOW Corpus is currently the largest tagged corpus of English in the world.
" [T] here is no data like more data,"1 94 and the chief virtues of the NOW Cor-
pus are its size and immediacy. With the NOW Corpus, the user is able to ex-
amine what is happening in the language at the moment. And because of the size
and scope of the corpus, lower frequency linguistic phenomena (words, word
senses, syntactic structures, etc.) are more likely to be attested, while the distri-
bution of higher frequency phenomena will be better and more completely rep-
resented.
The NOW Corpus has a few limitations. First, even with searches limited to
U.S. sources, the NOW Corpus records the language use of a single, large speech
community (the United States) in a single linguistic register (newsprint). But if
the interpretation of a federal statute requires us to consider the linguistic norms
and conventions of the citizens subject to that statute, then U.S. newsprint may
be the appropriate speech community and register. Spoken dialects of American
English show sharp (and increasing) differences in vocabulary, grammar, and
phonology, 95 but the norms and conventions of the written variety of American
English (sometimes called standard written American English) tend to be more
uniform. Since we are interpreting a written text, evaluating that text through
the lens of standard written American English (from newsprint) may be the
right approach.
The NOW Corpus is also limited with respect to timeframe. NOW tracks
the linguistic norms and conventions over the past decade. So if we want to eval-
uate interpretive problems against the backdrop of linguistic norms prevailing




194. Kenneth Church, Has Computational Linguistics Become More Applied?, in COMPUTATIONAL
LINGUISTICS AND INTELLIGENT TEXT PROCESSING 1, 3 (Alexander Gelbukh ed., 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (attributing the statement to Robert Mercer).





b. Corpus of Historical American English ("COHA")
The COH1A is "the largest structured corpus of historical English."196 It con-
tains "more than 400 million words of text from the 181os-2000s (which makes
it 50-oo times as large as other comparable historical corpora of English) and
the corpus is balanced by genre decade by decade.""' Using data from the
COT-A, we can gather linguistic information from the decade that a statute was
enacted, going back approximately 200 years.
Like the NOW Corpus, the COT-A is limited in terms of speech community
and register. Though it has texts from a wider variety of registers than the NOW
Corpus (including fiction, magazines, and non-fiction), these tend to fall within
the ambit of standard written American English. In addition, the 400 million
words of the COT-A are spread out over 200 years. Consequently, the COT-A is
essentially a collection of twenty separate corpora (one for each decade from 181o
to 2010) averaging just over twenty million words). 98
There is a lot of linguistic information to be gleaned from a twenty-million-
word corpus. But as we have seen, in the specialized setting of statutory inter-
pretation it is important to evaluate words in context. These contexts may be
poorly represented (or not represented at all) in the corpus with limited data for
a given period. The earliest texts in the COH1A date from the period of 181o to
1820. These texts come in twenty to thirty years shy of the Founding Era, leaving
us without a data source for the prevailing linguistic norms during the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution. 99
196. Corpus of Historical American English, BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/coha [http://perma.cc
/N44U-NQ8T].
197. Id.
198. For a breakdown of the total number of words in the COHA for each decade, go to http://
corpus.byu.edu/coha and click on "400 million words." Note that any searches performed will
normalize frequency measurements in words-per-million, so that measurements of statistical
frequency over multiple decades will not be adversely affected by differences in the number of
words in the corpus for each decade.
199. There are good reasons for this omission. Prior to the 1806 publication of Noah Webster's
influential text, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language, American spelling was very
much in disarray, with many common words having as many as a half dozen potential spell-
ings. This makes the construction of a corpus interface and the automated tagging of corpus
data very difficult (and expensive). Moreover, because of widely varied orthographic practices,
many historical texts are difficult, if not impossible, to subject to optimal character recognition
("OCR"). BYU Law School is seeking to fill this gap. It is currently working on a Corpus of
the Founding Era American English ("COFEA"). See Law & Corpus Linguistics Conference,
BYU LAw: LAw & CouUs LINGUISTICS, http://lawcorpus.byu.edu [http://perma.cc/S256
-N8FQ].
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With all of that said, the COH1A remains the largest corpus of historical
American English and it contains significant linguistic information relevant to
the statutes at issue in Muscarello, Taniguchi, and Costello.
B. Applications
1. Vehicles in the Park
The "no vehicles" problem seems a mandatory subject for any serious treat-
ment of statutory interpretation. It was introduced initially by Professor H.L.A.
Hart200 in his famous debate with Professor Lon Fuller,20 1 but seemingly every-
one has treated the problem since then.2 02 There is also no shortage of extensions
of the hypothetical. Hart says that " [p] lainly" the rule "forbids an automobile,"
but asks "about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles" and airplanes.2 03 The
airplane example invokes an actual case -McBoyle v. United States,204 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held that an airplane was not a vehicle under the Na-
tional Motor Vehicle Theft Act, which prohibited transporting stolen "vehicles"
across state or national borders.20 5
The scholars cited throughout this Article have offered their own views on
the scope of "vehicle." Justice Scalia and Garner's Reading Law says that the Hart
prohibition should extend to any "sizable wheeled conveyance," and thus to au-
tomobiles -including "ambulances, golf carts, mopeds, motorcycles, and (per-
haps) Segways" -but not "remote-controlled model cars, baby carriages, tricy-
cles, or perhaps even bicycles."206 Professor Fallon objects to the extension to
ambulances. He says the "reasonable meaning" of vehicle should not be under-
stood to extend to ambulances - at least those responding to emergencies.2 0 7
Professor William Eskridge disagrees with Justice Scalia and Garner's suggestion
as to bicycles; he says that "bicycles are commonly considered vehicles," a con-
clusion he claims to confirm using corpus data.20 8
200. Hart, supra note 41, at 607.
201. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 63o,
662-69 (1958).
202. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 45-46; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 36-39; Fallon,
supra note 2, at 1260-62.
203. Hart, supra note 41, at 607-08.
204. 283 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1931).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2012).
2o6. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 37-38.
207. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1260-61.




Yet there has been very little attempt to assess the ordinary meaning of vehicle
with any data. We present some relevant data below, concerning the frequency
or prototypicality of various senses of this term.
a. Lexical Collocation of Vehicle Through Time
One way to examine the most common context in which a word appears is
collocation. The collocation function of the corpus can show us the words that
are statistically most likely to appear in the same context as vehicle for a given
period. We can use collocation to get a snapshot of the semantic environment in
which vehicle appears and the kinds of vehicles that tend to appear in that envi-
ronment.
We can view the most common contemporary collocates209 of vehicle in the
NOW Corpus.210 In NOW, the fifty most common collocates of vehicle are as
follows:
electric, motor, plug-in, unmanned, armored, connected, cars, aerial, charging,
pure, launch, owners, hybrid, traffic, fuel, driving, gas, autonomous, struck,
operating, road, safety, accidents, battery, ownership, emergency, batteries,
emissions, seat, advanced, driver, primary, demand, gmv, commandeered, fuel-
efficient, uavs, automakers, demonstrators, excluding, lunar, passenger, fleet,
gasoline, luxury, drove, parking, retirement, vehicles, infrastructure2 11
Many of the collocates of vehicle in the NOW Corpus strongly indicate auto-
mobile as a likely candidate for the most common use of the term. The NOW
Corpus lists a number of automotive collocates like motor, car, traffic,fuel, driving,
209. The NOW Corpus and other BYU corpora are available without a subscription. To access
NOW, go to http://corpus.byu.edu/now. To generate a list of collocates in NOW, take the
following steps: (1) Select "Collocates" on the NOW Corpus homepage; (2) Enter "VEHI-
CLE n" in the "Word/phrase" field (capitalization makes the search lemmatized -assuring
that we find all inflections of the word; the "_n" is to limit the search to noun forms); (3)
Enter an asterisk "*" (a wildcard) in the "Collocates" field; (4) Select "Sections" and select
"United States" in column "1" (ignoring column "2"); (5) Select "Sort/Limit" and set the
"Minimum" to "MUT INFO"; and (6) Click "Find collocates."
210. The following link will reproduce the search above, except that the user would need to repeat
step four, select "Sections,' and select "United States,' which doesn't repopulate automatically.
See NOW Corpus (News on the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now/?c=now&q=54596
680 (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
211. The search results are saved at the following link. See NOW Corpus (News on the Web), BYU,
http://corpus.byu.edu/now/?c=now&q=52902048 (last visited Dec. 21, 2016).
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gas, battery, batteries,212 emissions, driver, fuel-efficient, automakers, gasoline, drove,
and parking. It also includes more recent automotive collocates of vehicle like elec-
tric, plug-in, connected, charging, and hybrid. Some of the collocates by themselves
have a range of possible uses (owners, operating, safety, accidents, ownership, emer-
gency, seat, primary, infrastructure), but when examined in context almost always
indicate an automotive meaning.2 13 Airplane does not appear, though two par-
ticular types of aircraft are attested in the collocates -unmanned aerial vehicles
(drones) and spacecraft.2 14 Similarly, bicycle does not appear among the collo-
cates of vehicle in contemporary usage.
We can also examine the collocates of vehicle during the 195os, the decade of
the Hart/Fuller debate, in the COHA. These collocates are listed below:
motor, space, trucks, moving, wheeled, tax, self-propelled, passenger, unit,
tracked, orbit, test, b.g., launching, highways, tanks, license, robot, emergency,
units, taxes, streets, equipment, manned, armored, vehiclesfees, vehicle, trav-
eling, operate, loaded, fuel, commercial, driver, ride, traffic, designed, weight,
speed, cars, carrying, operation, unsafe, horse-drawn, high-powered, amphib-
ious, administrators, tactical, registration, delivery2 15
We can see from this data that the meaning of vehicle has evolved significantly
from the 195os, though the automotive use of vehicle predominated then as well.
The decade is remarkable as the first in which the spacecraft sense of vehicle ap-
pears, but also the last in which the horse-drawn collocate of vehicles appears.216
Unmanned does not appear, but manned vehicle does (spacecraft in this case).
Still, the overwhelmingly most common use of vehicle is the automotive sense,
while a number of context-specific possible senses are attested. Again, none of
the top fifty collocates of vehicle include the notions of airplane or bicycles.
212. Collocates are not lemmatized in the BYU corpora, so the singular and plural form of a given
collocate are counted separately. In this case, that means that battery and batteries both make
the list separately.
213. To the extent that there is any doubt that any of these collocates suggest the automotive mean-
ing of vehicle, clicking on any of the listed collocates in the NOW Corpus interface will display
the context in which it appears and confirm the automotive meaning is intended. For example,
it is possible to speak of bicycle traffic or airplane emissions, but in the context of the word vehicle,
the words traffic and emissions are used in the automotive sense.
214. NOW Corpus (News on the Web), supra note 211.
215. See The Corpus of Historical American English, BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/?c=coha&q
=52600298 (last visited Dec. 21, 2016).
216. An additional vehicle is added to our collection with amphibious vehicle, and tanks makes an
appearance again. Two collocates (the abbreviation b.g. for background, and robot) are the





We can also use the COT-A to examine the collocates of vehicle from the pe-
riod relevant to the McBoyle case. Because the statute at issue in McBoyle was
enacted in 1919,217 and because the COT-A only allows us to search in ten-year
increments, it may make sense to include data from 1910 through 1930.
Whether or not the use of the word vehicle "evoke[s] in the common mind
only the picture of vehicles moving on land," as Justice Holmes suggests, may
not be a question that can be addressed with a corpus.2 18 But the collocate data
from this period (consistent with the collocate data above) allow us to draw a
similar inference that the automotive use is the most common use of vehicle, and
that the airplane sense remains unattested:
motor, horse-drawn, wheeled, horses, pedestrians, kinds, expression, driver,
passing, moving, various, horse, automobiles, tax, heavy, drawn, carry, road-
less, rickety, trucks, communication, approaching, traffic, electric, mental,
physical, 3,500,ooo, astral, belonging, steam, transportation, commissioner,
rear, total, carrying, propulsion, propelled, oncoming, carriages, registration,
ego, conceivable, tires, drivers, vehicle, carriers, 45, loaded, halted, manufac-
turers219
The collocates from this period add a few interesting vehicles to our growing
list, including astral vehicle (a reference to the theosophical notion of an "inter-
mediate between the intelligent soul and the mental body, composed of a subtle
material").220 It should also be noted that only a few of the collocates in this pe-
riod occur more than once, and only four-motor, horse-drawn, wheeled, and
horses- occur ten times or more, with motor occurring twice the number of times
as the other three combined.22 1
From the collocates of vehicle displayed by the NOW Corpus and the COHA,
we can make the following preliminary observations (observations that we can
later confirm by reviewing KWIC data). First, the collocates of vehicle strongly
suggest that the most common use of vehicle is with reference to automobiles.
Second, the absence of airplane and bicycle in the top fifty collocates of vehicle
217. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1931) (citing the National Motor Vehicle
Theft Act, 18 U.S.C. § 408 (1928)).
218. Id. at 27.
219. See The Corpus of Historical American English, BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/?c=coha&q
= 53847214 (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
220. See Astral Body, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/astral-body [http://perma.cc
/R98L-A 5 7 F]. This notion also explains the presence of ego and mental in the collocates of
vehicle.
221. See supra note 219.
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raises an important question for our frequency continuum.2 22 If we accept that
the necessary and sufficient conditions of vehicle are " [a] ny means of carriage,
conveyance, or transport"2 2 3 or a means of carrying or transporting some-
thing,"224 then there seems little question that both an airplane and a bicycle are
possible readings of vehicle. But if vehicle is never used to refer to bicycle or airplane
in the corpus data, then we may end up with an even further extension of our
frequency continuum from possible but rare to possible but unattested. Before jump-
ing to the conclusion that the airplane and bicycle uses of vehicle are entirely un-
attested in the corpora or the language at large, however, we should evaluate the
use of vehicle in the concordance data.
b. Vehicle as a KVWIC
We can extract concordance data from the NOW Corpus.22 5 A NOW search
for concordance lines of vehicle will yield an output along these lines:
222. It is worth noting that while the words airplane and plane do not appear among the collocates
of vehicle during any of the timeframes examined above, there are, at least, a number of aircraft
terms that do appear, including reference to two specific types of aircraft: spacecraft and un-
manned aerial drones. It is not clear why the more general terms airplane and plane do not ap-
pear in the collocate data for vehicle, while terms like spacecraft and unmanned aerial drone do
appear.
223. 19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 480 (2d ed. 1989).
224. WEBSTER'S THIRDNEWINTERNATIONALDICTIONARY2538 (1961).
225. The concordance line search in NOW is executed as follows: (1) Select "KWIC" on the NOW
Corpus homepage; (2) Enter "VEHICLEn" in the "Word/phrase" field; (3) Click on "Sec-
tions" and select "United States"; (4) Click "Keyword in Context (KIWIC)." See NOW Corpus
(News on the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now/?c=now&q=54499369 (last visited
Mar. 5, 2017). By selecting "Options" and "# KWIC,' the corpus user can select the number
of randomized concordance lines to be reviewed. While the search parameters can be saved in
a link, the corpus randomizes the results, and, in the case of the NOW Corpus, the corpus
updates with millions of new words on a nightly basis. Therefore, until the BYU corpora de-
velop the ability to save the exact content of a particular randomized search, it is useful to copy





KWIC OF VEHICLE2 6
the driver, Bhaskar Jha, apparently
lost control of the
of the troopers. Parrott says the
suspects in the
injury and leaving a child under
12 unsupervised in a motor
Hybrid electric vehicles use
regenerative braking (when the
pushed onto the property because
of the speed of which these
2009. That day the two officers
saw a
say automakers would be better.
Wakefield says autonomous
biogas, and Daimler, which
supplies a number of experimental
is that they aren't kept on file with
the Motor
vehicle because he was traveling too fastfor the wet road conditions.
vehicle began showing aggression and
shots rang out. Corporal Shane
vehicle but released on a written promise
to appear.) Risk
vehicle captures energy that would be
otherwise lost from braking) and
veilscollide," said Dr. Tom Lawrence,vehiclesof Clinical Nutrition
vehicle connected to a domestic violence
case in which shots had been
vehicles could erode the image of certainbrands more than others. Brands
vehicles designed to run on natural gas.The German Federal Ministry of
Vehicle Division or any other entity. By
contrast, beneficiary
The KWIC output in the NOW Corpus allows us to select anywhere from one
hundred to one thousand randomized sample uses of vehicle(s) and display them
in their semantic environment. To the extent that the snippet view above fails to
provide sufficient evidence of usage, the corpus interface allows us to click
through to an expanded passage from the article referenced in a given concord-
ance line.
In order to examine the sense distribution of vehicle, we reviewed one hun-
dred randomized concordance lines of vehicle in the NOW Corpus. Of those,
ninety-one were automobiles. There was a single reference to a bus, and one ref-
erence to an ambulance, but in every other instance, a passenger car was refer-
enced. Of the remaining vehicles, there was one cargo ship, one jet ski, and an
ambiguous reference to a military ground vehicle of an unknown type. There
were three metaphorical uses of vehicle (e.g., the role of the city as a vehicle for
841
226. Note that these concordance lines have been shortened to fit this page. Moreover, because the
content of the corpus is constantly updated, and because the results of the search are typically
randomized, a search performed on any given day will provide a different data set.
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development). The results also contained a reference to the military's efforts to
create a flying Humvee/helicopter hybrid.227
The NOW Corpus data included no airplanes, bicycles, tricycles, skateboards,
roller-skates, toy cars, or any of what Hart and others have characterized as pe-
numbral, disputed cases. To the extent that our notion of ordinary meaning has
a frequency component, this data suggests that automobile is overwhelmingly the
most common use of the word vehicle in the modern written American English
represented in the NOW Corpus. The corpus data also suggest that there are
numerous possible (if much less common) uses of vehicle, and that some seem-
ingly possible meanings are unattested and may not be current.
A similar review of data from the COH1A for the 1950s showed a wider range
of vehicles. Still, approximately sixty-five percent of the usages of vehicles during
this timeframe referred to automobiles. Another thirty percent referred to the
space program or missile defense, while the remaining five percent referred to
metaphorical uses of vehicle (e.g., a film as a starring vehicle for an actor). For
the period spanning the 1910s and 1920s, automobiles made up approximately
sixty percent of the instances of vehicle. References to carriages or horse-drawn
vehicles were more common, and there were a significant number of cases where
the choice between automobile and horse-drawn vehicle was not clear. (When a
text from 1915 says that Fifth Avenue was crowded with vehicles, it is not clear
from context whether automobiles, carriages, or both were intended.) Finally,
there were a number of references to theosophy and the notion of an astral vehi-
cle. The COT-A data also included no references to airplanes, bicycles, tricycles,
skateboards, roller-skates, or toy cars for either period.
c. Searching for Vehicles in the Context of a Park
Hart's interpretive puzzle is not simply about vehicles at large, but vehicles in
the park. As we have discussed, with the corpus we can examine the question of
ordinary meaning in the relevant semantic and syntactic context. We can search
for vehicles that collocate with the term park.228
227. We are not making this up. See Aerial Reconfigurable Embedded System, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AerialReconfigurableEmbedded System [http://perma.cc
/9HVS-82R9].
228. (1) Select "Collocates" on the NOW Corpus homepage; (2) Enter "VEHICLEn" in the
"Word/phrase" field; (3) Enter "PARKn" in the "Collocates" field; (4) Select "Sections" and
select "United States"; (5) Select "Sort/Limit" and set the "Minimum" to "FREQUENCY"
and "15"; (6) Click "Find collocates"; and (7) Click "PARIC" or "PARKS." See NOW Corpus





A review of the concordance data from this search reveals at least one limita-
tion of the corpus. We can search for specific parts of speech (e.g., nouns, verbs),
but not specific senses. That means that our search for vehicles in the park must
begin by eliminating the approximately forty percent of the concordance lines
that refer to vehicles that are in park as opposed to in reverse, neutral, or drive.
Approximately five percent of the concordance lines refer to recreational vehicles
in recreational vehicle parks. Of the remaining instances of vehicle, more than
fifty percent refer specifically to automobiles. Bicycles are not attested in this con-
text, nor are airplanes, skateboards, or roller skates.
Our understanding of a prohibition on vehicles in the park may depend largely
on the physical and spatial characteristics of the park itself. If a municipal park
has no means of ingress or egress for automobiles, then we might assume that
cutting across the grass in a car would be prohibited. It is not surprising then
that where municipal parks are concerned, the vehicle most likely to show up in
the context of park in the corpus data (i.e., automobiles) is often not in the park,
as in (1) and (2) below:
(1) juvenile[s] were taken into custody Wednesday, accused of discharging a
BB gun at passing vehicles near Sunset Park.
(2) two males in another vehicle near a park on Toledo's west side when one of
those males opened fire
In the very rare circumstance in which there is any actual debate about vehi-
cles in municipal parks, such debates tend to center around closing off exist-
ing roads through the park, as in (3) below:
(3) A revived plan to remove vehicle traffic from the center of San Diego's Bal-
boa Park was moved forward Monday by the City Council, which agreed to
spend $1 million to complete planning and documentation.
Yet even in the specific park context, where the physical and spatial features of a
park might seem to preclude the entrance of an automobile, it is the automobile
usage of vehicle that predominates.
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d. Is Bicycle a Vehicle? Is Airplane a Vehicle?
We can use the KWIC function of the corpus to perform targeted searches
for concordance lines featuring two key terms raised in the Hart/Fuller debate -
bicycle and airplane.229
Professor Eskridge has asserted that "[a] corpus search reveals that bicycles
are commonly considered vehicles - a quantitative result in striking contrast to
the understanding advanced by linguist Bryan Garner, who joined Justice Scalia
in opining that the ordinary meaning of 'vehicles' excludes bicycles."230 Professor
Eskridge is certainly correct that there are numerous instances of the co-occur-
rence of bicycle with vehicle. Some of these instances establish that the bicycle
sense of vehicle is, at the very least, attested, as in (1) and (2) below:
(1) There are a lot of potholes. It is hard to ride bicycles and other vehicles.
(2) In New Jersey, bicycles are considered vehicles and must follow the same
laws as motorists.
Yet other instances show that bicycle is often used in contrast to the word
vehicle, as in (3) and (4) below:
(3) there were 68 collisions between bicycles, pedestrians and vehicles
(4) side mirrors to detect hazards (bicycles, humans, vehicles, pets, etc.)
Based on the corpus data reviewed above, bicycle is certainly a possible sense
of vehicle, but from the standpoint of statistical frequency, it is not a common
meaning and certainly not the most common.
With respect to the use of vehicle to reference airplane, the answer is simpler.
In both the contemporary NOW Corpus and the COHA (for the relevant peri-
ods of the 191os, 1920s, and 195os), we were unable to find a single collocation
or concordance line that reflected the use of vehicle to mean airplane. Vehicle is
neither most commonly used nor even commonly used when discussing air-
planes, and based on its absence from any of our corpus data, we might ask if
airplane is even a possible sense of vehicle. To the extent that airplane fits what
some lexicographers have regarded as the necessary and sufficient conditions for
229. (1) Select "Collocates" on the NOW Corpus homepage; (2) Enter "VEHICLEn" in the
"Word/phrase" field; (3) Enter "BICYCLEn" in the "Collocates" field; (4) Select "Sections"
and select "United States"; (5) Select "Sort/Limit" and set the "Minimum" to "MUT INFO"
and "3"; (6) Click "Find collocates"; and (7) Click "BICYCLES." See NOW Corpus (News on
the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now/?c=now&q= 54497865 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).




inclusion in the class of vehicles (i.e., anything that is a "means of carriage, con-
veyance, or transport"), all that can be said of airplane is that it may be a possible
meaning of vehicle, but it is unattested in the corpus data.
Thus, corpus linguistics can advance the theory of ordinary meaning by, on
the one hand, allowing judges and lawyers to more specifically define what they
mean by ordinary and, on the other hand, providing objective data illustrating
the way in which words are used in particular contexts.
2. Muscarello and Carries a Firearm
The Muscarello question - of the meaning of carry - is likewise susceptible to
measurement. We can assess the relative frequency of the personally bear sense
and the transport sense using corpus analysis.
a. The Collocates of Carry
We can view collocation data for carry in the NOW Corpus. The fifty most
common collocates of carry in the NOW Corpus are listed as follows:
out, yards, concealed, weight, gun, attacks, weapons, guns, sentence, weapon,
exchange, maximum, margin, passengers, heavy, penalty, bag, signs, opinions,
firearm, express, burden, permit, thoughtful, load, bags, planefirearms, virus,
tradition, flag, capable, torch, handgun, cargo, openly, permits, duties, pipe-
line, mosquitoes, touchdowns, ships, executions, loads, trucks, felony, tasks,
handguns, experiments, knife231
These collocates suggest that a number of uses of carry do not fit neatly into
the syntactic structure and the semantic relationships we have previously identi-
fied. There are instances in which an inanimate object serves as carry's subject
(planes carrying passengers, trucks carrying loads, ships carrying cargo). There are
also a number metaphorical uses of carry (felonies carrying certain penalties, people
carrying opinions). There are also references to carrying out of attacks and execu-
tions, and sporting references (carrying the ball for so many yards or for so many
touchdowns).232
231. Follow the same steps set forth in note 209, substituting "CARRY v" for "VEHICLE n." See
NOW Corpus (News on the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now/?c=now&q=54o15027
(last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
232. We can see similar results in the COHA using the same instructions in note 231, except that
when we click on "Sections" we select "1960." The results of this search in the COHA can be
viewed at the link below. See Corpus of Historical American English, BYU, http://corpus.byu
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Yet "[a]t issue here is not 'carries' at large, but 'carries a firearm."'233 And a
list of collocates simply tending to show that there are a variety of small, inani-
mate, concrete objects (including weapons) that can be carried on your person
or in your car does not get us much closer to determining which of these senses
of carry is the most frequent.2 34 But as we will see, this search reveals common
collocates of carry that have similar semantic features to firearm (i.e., pistol, hand-
gun, rifle, gun) that will help us better evaluate the contexts in which carry afire-
arm occurs.
b. Carry as a KWIC
The KWIC data give us a clearer picture of the use of carry.235 The NOW
Corpus gives us a randomized sample of concordance lines featuring carry,236
and we can review these concordance lines to determine both the range of pos-
sible meanings of carry and the comparative frequency of those meanings. We
can also locate (and determine the comparative frequency) of instances of carry
with the same syntactic and semantic features as § 924(c)(1).
Yet we might be able to eliminate a lot of irrelevant uses of carry by searching
instead for carry within a few words offirearm.2 37 A search for concordance lines
containing these terms will require coding. Because every interpretative question
is different, the process of coding concordance lines will vary with each task.
.edu/coha/?c=coha&q=54015512 (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). The COHA, when divided by dec-
ade, results in a functionally smaller corpus for that decade. As a consequence, it is more sus-
ceptible to being offset by unusual collocations.
233. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234. As we will see, in the case of carry, the collocates do help us in identifying words with similar
semantic features as firearm - gun(s), weapon(s), handgun(s), rifle(s), pistol(s) - and that
would serve similar functional roles in a sentence. This will help us locate relevant concord-
ance data, but does not answer the question of which sense of carry is most common.
235. One way to examine carry in context is simply to enter a search similar to that in note 225, but
substituting "CARRY v" for "VEHICLEn."
236. As we have already seen, carry has a transitive argument structure and, in the relevant context
of § 924(c)(1), carry has a human subject and a non-human, inanimate, weapon object. See
supra Section II.A.2. If we are going to take context into consideration, we should be looking
for uses of carry that reflect the same or similar syntactic structure and semantic relationship.
237. Such a search can be executed as follows: (1) Select "Collocates" on the NOW Corpus
homepage; (2) Enter "CARRY v" in the "Word/phrase" field; (3) Enter "FIREARM n" in
the "Collocates" field; (4) Click on "Sections" and select "United States"; (5) Select
"Sort/Limit" and set the "Minimum" to "FREQUENCY" and "3"; and (6) Click "Find collo-
cates." See NOW Corpus (News on the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now/?c=now&q




Here, after examining only a few concordance lines, a problem emerges: a sig-
nificant majority of the instances of carry in the context of firearm in the NOW
Corpus refer back to the statutory prohibition in § 924(c) (1) or similar statutes.
In order to ensure that we have sufficient data from outside of a legal context,
we also examined instances of carry in the context of a number of common syn-
onyms offirearm listed among the most common collocates of carry -gun(s), pis-
tol(s), handgun(s), and rifle(s). These synonyms share the same semantic features
with firearm, but less commonly appear in statutory prohibitions against carry-
ing a firearm.
Our search parameters eliminate a number of irrelevant uses of carry.238 All
that is left is to review the concordance lines and determine in how many in-
stances carry afirearm refers to carry on one's person or carrying in a car. Here, the
physical and spatial context can be helpful, as with the physical locations in (1),
(2), and (3) below:
(1) Dressed in body armor and carrying two handguns, [the suspect] tried to
flee out a back door ....
(2) adults with the proper permits no longer need to hide the handguns they
carry in their shoulder or belt holsters ....
(3) the crowd was sedate and well-behaved with those carrying guns checking
their ammunition at the door.
A number of concordance lines were unclear, and a number of them, as
noted, refer to statutory provisions similar to § 924(c)(1).
All told, we reviewed 271 concordance lines from the NOW Corpus in which
carry co-occurred withfirearm(s), gun(s), pistol(s), handgun(s), and rifle(s). Of
these instances of carry, we found that 104 instances indicated a sense of carry a
firearm on one's person, while only five instances suggested a carry a firearm in a
car sense. The remaining senses either were unclear (i.e., the appropriate sense
could not be determined by context) or were senses of carry unrelated to the
question at hand. As would be expected, much less data was available for carry
in the COHA. We found twenty-eight concordance lines from the COHA, in
which carry co-occurred with firearm(s), gun(s), pistol(s), handgun(s), and ri-
fle(s). Of these instances of carry, we found that eighteen were instances of carry
on ones person, and two were instances of carry in a car. The remaining instances
were either unclear or reflected a different sense of carry.
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238. For example, the metaphorical sense (carry a tune), senses where the subject or agent is an
inanimate object (the ship carries cargo), and the sporting sense (carried the football nine yards)
were all eliminated.
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To the extent that we view the question of ordinary meaning as involving
statistical frequency, the analysis above tells us that carry on one's person is over-
whelmingly the most common use, while carry in a car is a possible but far less
common use.
3. Taniguchi and the Meaning of Interpreter
We can also measure the relative frequency of the written translator and oral
translator senses of interpreter. We can do so using collocation and concordance
analysis.
a. The Collocates of Interpreter
The fifty most common collocates of interpreter in the NOW Corpus are as
follows:
an, through, language, sign, spanish, via, speaking, afghan, translators, iraqi,
certified, served, english, qualified, translator, army, basic, deaf spoke, moder-
ator, sign-language, asl, costumed, interpreter, translate, full-time, dream,
trained, soldiers, yun, interpreters, arabic, translated, translation, freelance,
certification, courts, maladies, requests, spanish-language, communicate,
cespedes, languages, troops, carlotto, simultaneous, somali, listened, proceed-
ings, employed239
A number of the collocates tend to support the Taniguchi majority's position
that interpreter most commonly refers to an interpreter of spoken language. These
include speaking, spoke, and listen. A number of the collocates refer to battlefield
interpreters (such as Afghan or Iraqi),240 where context would suggest their role
is primarily as spoken interpreters. The collocates an and through both come
from the very common phrase that a public figure is speaking through an inter-
preter. These collocates stand in contrast to the collocates of translator in the
NOW Corpus, which make a number of references to the writing and publishing
contexts, including bible, writer, poet, editor, literary, publisher, journalist, Borders,
239. See NOW Corpus (News on the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now/?c=now&q
=54018483.
240. We do not need to assume that the Afghan or Iraqi interpreters listed in the collocate display
are battlefield interpreters. By clicking on each individual collocate in the display, we can view
concordance lines - lines of running text showing the word in context. This expanded context




and even Wycliffe.24 1 The collocates from the 1970s, when the Court Interpreters
Act was passed, suggest a similar conclusion.24 2
b. Interpreter as a KVVIC
With respect to Key Words in Context, we reviewed 188 concordance lines
from the NOW Corpus in which interpreter occurred.243 In a number of in-
stances, interpreter referenced an artistic expression or the interpretation of works
of art (a noted interpreter of modern music). Another common sense refers to the
interpretation of documents written in a primary language (interpreters of the
Constitution). There were numerous instances in both corpora of cases of the
spoken language conversion from a primary language to a second language no-
tion of interpreter, as in (1) and (2) below:
(1) civil rights violations for not providing professional interpreters for pa-
tients who do not feel comfortable speaking English
(2) Motto was speaking in French, through a volunteer interpreter
In addition, there were numerous transcripts of spoken interviews from
news sites with the annotation "through interpreter," referencing a spoken inter-
view facilitated by an interpreter. There was one instance of an interpreter trans-
lating a foreign language document into spoken English, included below:
(3) In 1992, during a top-level meeting in Moscow, Russia finally released the
cockpit voice recorder transcript. It was lo p.m. in a dimly lit meeting room of
the Presidential Hotel when an interpreter for the U.S. ambassador translated
the Russian transcript into English for Ephraimson-Abt and other delegates.
241. See NOW Corpus (News on the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now/?c=now&q=546
09539 (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
242. Interpreter has very few frequent collocates during the 1970s. The two most common collo-
cates of interpreter from this period are an and through, function words that mutual infor-
mation scoring typically eliminates if other options are available. A review of the concordance
lines associated with these collocates reveals their origin in the extremely common phrase
speaking through an interpreter, or related phrases. See Corpus of Historical American English,
BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/?c= coha&q= 54495283 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
243. The statute at issue in Taniguchi states: "A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may
tax as costs the following: ... (6) Compensation of interpreters . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(2012). The noun phrase compensation of interpreters is part of a standalone enumeration that
has an attenuated relationship to the argument structure of the verb to tax. What we can say
about the relevant context for interpreter is that we are looking for individuals who are capable
of decoding a foreign language into a native one. The operative variable is whether the lan-
guage at issue is spoken or written.
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Absent from all of these concordance lines was a single instance of anyone
referred to as an interpreter performing a text-to-text translation from a foreign
language into a primary language like English. To the extent that our notion of
ordinary meaning has a frequency component, we can say from this data that the
text-to-text translation sense of interpreter is neither the most common nor even
a common use of interpreter. We might question whether it is even a possible
sense of interpreter as the text-to-text translator sense of interpreter is entirely un-
attested in our data.
4. Costello and Harboring an Alien
The interpretive issue in Costello bears some similarity to the question at issue
in Muscarello. In both cases the question turns on the meaning of a transitive
verb and its relation to its object, though in the case of harbor our object has the
semantic features of human, animate, etc. We would therefore look to the corpus
data to tell us which senses of harbor are the most frequent, common, or possible
senses of harbor, and to help us make informed decisions about sense division.
We will look at the use of harbor in contemporary English, using the NOW Cor-
pus, and in the decade 1910-1919, the period during which the relevant statute
was enacted.244
a. Collocation of Harbor
With respect to the collocation data, it is immediately apparent from a review
of the collocates of harbor that the overwhelmingly most common use of the term
harbor refers to harboring feelings:
bacteria, feelings, resentment, doubts, terrorists, species, secret, mariners, views,
ambitions, immigrants, fugitive, planets, illusions, hatred, dreams, cells, mu-
tations, ocean, hopes, animosity, virus, secrets, anger, grudge, suspicions, fan-
tasies, planet, frars, sentiments, desire, pathogens, galaxy, viruses, suspicion,
244. See NOW Corpus (News on the Web), BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/now/?c=now&q=544
96834 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). This search examines only the nominal (noun) collocates of
harbor. Harbor is a low frequency verb and as such instances of harbor are rare in the COHA
for the period of 1910-1919. Even expanding the search through the 1920s reveals only a sparse
number of collocates. While some of these are relevant to our present inquiry (such as alien
and refugee), no other relevant collocate appears more than once in the COHA. See Corpus of
Historical American English, BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/?c=coha&q=54496926 (last




persons, thoughts, fugitives, germs, mutation, tumors, aliens, moon, bias,
genes, gene, hole, diversity, grudges, resentments245
This use of harbor does not match the semantic features in the relevant stat-
ute. We are looking for objects of harbor that are human, animate, concrete, etc.
With that in mind, we tailored our searches to those nominal objects of harbor
reflected in the collocates listed above that had these same semantic features -
fugitives, terrorists, criminals, aliens, and refugees.
b. Harbor as a KWIC
In the NOW Corpus, we examined 140 concordance lines in which harbor
occurred in the same environment as fugitives, terrorists, criminals, aliens, and ref-
ugees. Of these, twenty-three instances of harbor referred to concealment while
thirty-two referred to shelter. In an additional eighty-three instances, the distinc-
tion could not be determined by context. There were also three instances of un-
related senses of harbor. In the COHA, there were only three clear-cut cases of
the shelter sense. The remaining five instances of harbor could not be determined
by context.
This data raises more questions than it answers. With respect to frequency,
we would be hard-pressed to say that either the shelter meaning or the conceal
meaning of harbor are the most common. We might say that both are common
meanings, and they are both certainly possible and attested meanings. But where
more than half of the instances of harbor are unclear as to whether they include
shelter or concealment or both, it is hard to state from the standpoint of frequency
what the ordinary meaning actually is.
C. Caveats and Conclusions
Such are the data. But what to make of them? Do corpus data yield means of
measuring ordinary meaning? We think the answer is a resounding yes -with a
few caveats. Certainly, the answer is yes by comparison with existing means of
measurement. If ordinary meaning is an empirical construct- and we think it
is - then corpus analysis is superior to an intuitive guess (or, worse, crediting a
dictionary or a word's etymology).
We also think that corpus data are well suited to give reliable answers to the
question of ordinary meaning. To support this conclusion (as applied to the
problems analyzed throughout the Article), here we provide a more careful syn-
thesis of the theory of ordinary meaning discussed above. We then offer some
245. See id.
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conclusions about what the corpus data tell us about the ordinary meaning of
vehicle, carry ajirearm, interpreter, and harbor.
1. Caveats
Corpus analysis may be applied to the range of issues bearing on ordinary
meaning identified above - to semantic context, pragmatic context, the temporal
aspects of meaning, and speech community and register. Through data from the
COHA, the NOW Corpus, or other corpora, we can assess the relative frequency
of competing senses of a statutory term or phrase. From frequency and colloca-
tion data we can draw inferences about the semantic meaning of the language of
the law and even about intended or public meaning. Yet we see some possible
limitations on the strength of the inferences to be drawn from this sort of data.
a. Semantic Meaning
One possible limitation stems from the vagaries of word sense division.
Sense division is subjective.24 6 Linguists, as noted above, have no agreed-upon
formula for distinguishing senses of a word.247 They concede that distinctions
among senses may be "more of a descriptive device rather than a claim about
psycholinguistic reality."248 This seems particularly true as regards closely related
or fine-grained sense distinctions. The space between some senses will be suffi-
cient to justify a strong inference from clear corpus data. Consider the above-
cited example of the use of the term nail in Reading Law: "Nail in a regulation
246. Nikola Dobri6, Word Sense Disambiguation Using ID Tags-Identifying Meaning in Polysemous
Words in English, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEXIS AND
GRAMmAR/LGC 97, 97 (Dusko Vitas & Cvetana Krstev eds., 2010) (explaining that poly-
semy -multiple word meaning -is " [o]ne of the persisting issues in modem lexicography").
247. No one is quite sure where to draw the line - research "show [s] that different polysemy crite-
ria (i.e., criteria that may be invoked to establish that a particular interpretation of a lexical
item constitutes a separate sense rather than just being a case of vagueness or generality) may
be mutually contradictory, or may each yield different results in different contexts." DIRK
GEERAERTS, THEORIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 196 (2009). And there is no agreed-upon tax-
onomy of polysemy. While some linguists speak of senses and subsenses, see, e.g., Glynn, supra
note 136, at 17, others speak of more or less prototypical exemplars of senses, see, e.g., Dagmar
Divjak & Antti Arppe, Extracting Prototypes from Exemplars: What Can Corpus Data Tell Us
About Concept Representation?, 24 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 221, 222-30 (2013).
248. Gries, supra note 136, at 482. The "problem of an apparent lack of decisive criteria for defining
word senses and clearly discriminating between them has always been a burning issue of lex-
ical semantics to the point that it fundamentally questions the possibility to provide a clear




governing a beauty salon has a different meaning from nail in a municipal build-
ing code."249 Surely we could confirm that using corpus data. We could show
that the term nail as used in the context of a beauty salon is almost always with
reference to a fingernail or toenail. We would likely feel confident concluding
that such data supports the conclusion that the ordinary understanding of nail
in this semantic setting is not a piece of metal used to attach pieces of wood.
But what about more closely related senses? The two competing notions of
carry in Muscarello are closely related. Both get at the idea of transport; the differ-
ence concerns the mechanism- on one's person or in a vehicle. Accordingly, it
seems hard to know whether this difference is reflected in the way that human
beings perceive the different uses of carry. The bear personally sense seems to be
the notion of carry that we speak of almost always, and for that reason it may
also be the sense we think of most often. But if pressed, we might well concede
that the transport by vehicle sense may be encompassed within the way in which
we perceive the notion of carrying a firearm. It could be that most ordinary peo-
ple first think of the bear personally sense but on reflection agree that the transport
sense is included.
b. Pragmatic Meaning
Even with a very large corpus, some pragmatic information may be elusive -
because the relevant physical or social setting is rare, for example, or the prag-
matic information needed is not of the type that would appear in a corpus of
written texts.
Consider the two illustrations referenced above: Posner's "Keep off the
grass" sign at a park and Fallon's extension of the "no vehicles" rule. Posner
rightly says that the park sign would "not properly [be] interpreted to forbid the
grounds crew to cut the grass."250 And Fallon understandably asserts that the
lawmaker adopting the "no vehicles in the park" rule would "reasonably" be un-
derstood to intend for the "gatekeeper" at the park to allow an ambulance to
enter in the event of an emergency.251
We may be able to examine these questions from a corpus-based perspective.
If we had a large enough database, that contained a sufficient number of park
prohibitions (together with references to groundskeepers, ambulances, etc.), we
might be able to draw conclusions about the pragmatic circumstances in which
such prohibitions are most commonly invoked and how they are most com-
monly interpreted. To find any ordinary exceptions to the "Keep off the grass"
249. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 20.
250. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 180 (2013).
251. Fallon, supra note 2, at 1260-61.
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or the "no vehicles" rules we might look for park owners who have these rules in
place. If park owners and municipalities routinely allow ambulances into their
parks or routinely allow groundskeepers access, we can infer something about
how these prohibitions are ordinarily used or understood. The point is that cor-
pus analysis often contains at least some pragmatic data and is at least theoreti-
cally capable of providing information about the pragmatic context. But there is
no guarantee that even a very large and targeted corpus would contain sufficient
examples of circumstances with similar pragmatic content. And the question for
corpus linguistics is how much of the relevant pragmatic context is reflected in
the formal record found in the corpus.252
In many cases such meaning may be beyond the reach of most corpora that
are currently available. As to Muscarello, for example, it might be impossible to
find a corpus sufficient to identify the pragmatic components of the intended
meaning of a sentencing enhancement for carrying a firearm in connection with
a drug crime. If we are looking at the question of the intended meaning of Con-
gress, the right corpus may be one that would reflect dialogue among the 535
members that voted on the sentencing enhancement in § 924(c)(1). If we had
such a corpus, and if it recorded extensive discussion among them about the kind
of gun carrying they were talking about when they enacted this statute, we might
be able to get data of relevance to the intended meaning of this provision. Per-
haps it would reveal only examples of personal bearing of firearms and never of
transporting in a vehicle. If so, that might tell us that the intended meaning is
limited to the former.
Even then, however, the might qualifier is necessary. The limitation here is
whether a preponderance of examples of uses of one sense of carry may indicate
only that this is the first sense to come to mind, and whether a broader sense that
might occur to a lawmaker on reflection should count as ordinary. Moreover,
data from a general, balanced corpus could tell us something about the way the
human mind conceptualizes the notion of carrying a firearm. But that might not
be the right question to ask. We might be missing an important element of prag-
matic context if we ask only about carrying afirearm in the abstract. Another rel-
evant element of such context may be the legal nature of the language of this law.
The human mind may react differently to a criminal prohibition- a law impos-
ing harsh consequences like a sentencing enhancement-than to a mere state-
ment of description. Thus, we may form one understanding when listening to a
252. Not all corpora are collections of written texts. Recent work in corpus-based pragmatics in-
cludes "'multi-modal' corpora" with audio and visual components that allow researchers to
study "feedback in the form of gesture, body posture and gaze as well as their integration with
discourse." Christoph Rihlemann & Karin Aijmer, Introduction: Corpus Pragmatics: Laying the





descriptive narrative of a person carrying a firearm in connection with a drug
crime, and another when warned that the punishment for a drug crime could be
significantly enhanced if we carry a firearm in that circumstance. That sort of
context may be impossible to suss out with corpus analysis alone. We may have
to turn to other empirical approaches to language meaning and perception.
How might a judge answer this question? Some such questions may be
framed within the standard picture. Where the question is presented as one of
the likely intended meanings of rules like the "Keep off the grass" sign or the
prohibition on "vehicles," we think judges are in a good position to assess likely
intended meaning (even absent hard data about actual usage). We say that be-
cause we think the relevant pragmatic context of these rules is likely to be appar-
ent in the cited circumstances. It seems difficult to think of a legislative "com-
promise" that would call into question the inference of uniform legislative intent
to allow groundskeepers on the grass or ambulances in the park.253 If so, it seems
safe to conclude that the intended communicative content of these rules would
sustain exceptions for groundskeepers and ambulances.
That will not always be so, however. Muscarello may be a good example. If
we lack confidence in the corpus data on carry, we may be left to make an infer-
ence about likely legislative intent. Here that seems hard. As the majority and
dissenting opinions in that case demonstrate, it is easy to contemplate legislative
intent running in either of two directions - to call for a sentencing enhancement
(a) whenever a gun is available to the defendant in a drug deal, since a gun may
253. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note II, at 54 (stating that "laws will be messy, uneven,
and ill-fitting with their apparent purposes not because Congress is short-sighted or impre-
cise, but rather because legislation entails compromise, and compromise is untidy by na-
ture"); ScALiA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 39 ("Not only is legal drafting sometimes imper-
fect, but often the imperfection is the consequence of a compromise that it is not the function
of the courts to upset -or to make impossible for the future by disregarding the words
adopted."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 61, 68 (1994) (noting that if a particular outcome under a statute
seems "unprincipled,' it may be the "way of compromise" in the legislative process and that
"[1] aw is a vector rather than an arrow," "[e] specially when you see the hand of interest
groups").
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always be used in a harmful way if it is available,254 or (b) only if the gun is being
carried on the defendant's person, since that kind of availability is even riskier.25 5
Muscarello is thus an example of a case in which pragmatic judgments about
legislative intention are likely to be difficult. If we cannot decide the case on the
basis of usage, informed by semantic context, and if we lack reliable evidence
from similar pragmatic contexts, then we may be left to resolve it on other
grounds. Here we could simply turn to the law of interpretation- giving the law
legal content that does not pretend to be based on communicative content (be-
cause we have not been able to find it).2 5 6 We could do so, for example, on the
basis of a substantive canon like the rule of lenity. Reliance on that canon may
make sense doctrinally, as lenity appears appropriate given genuine ambiguity
about statutory meaning. Such a move, moreover, would be more open and
transparent than a false assertion about communicative content. For that reason,
we would favor it, even though it might not obviously vindicate the principles
motivating the law's baseline devotion to ordinary meaning.
254. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 133 (1998) ("How persuasive is a punishment that
is without effect until a drug dealer who has brought his gun to a sale (indeed has it available
for use) actually takes it from the trunk (or unlocks the glove compartment) of his car? It is
difficult to say that, considered as a class, those who prepare, say, to sell drugs by placing guns
in their cars are less dangerous, or less deserving of punishment, than those who carry hand-
guns on their person.").
255. Id. at 145 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("It is reasonable to comprehend Congress as having pro-
vided mandatory minimums for the most life -jeopardizing gun-connection cases (guns in or
at the defendant's hand when committing an offense), leaving other, less imminently threat-
ening, situations for the more flexible Guidelines regime.").
256. An alternative formulation would follow under the interpretive premises of the original meth-
ods originalists. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Lan-
guage of the Law (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 17-262, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com
/abstract id=2928936 [http://perma.cc/TD97-EJ6Q] (articulating premises of original
methods originalism, including the idea that the Constitution is written in the "language of
the law," not ordinary English, and thus that it should be interpreted in accordance with the
canons and legal conventions that would have been accepted by the legal community at the
time of the founding). To the extent the law is written in a specialized legal dialect, we can
think of the "law of interpretation" as a mere component of the "communicative content" of
the law. We can do so by treating canons of construction not as departing from communicative
content but as informing our understanding of the peculiar dialect of the law.
We have no problem with the framing proposed by McGinnis and Rappaport. But we
mostly speak here of a distinction between ordinary communicative content and the law of
interpretation- because we think the distinction helps highlight a component of the inquiry




c. Meaning as of When?
Judges sometimes make reference to the temporal aspects of interpretation
and insist that they are seeking the meaning of the text at the time it was drafted.
Yet in practice judges often ignore the temporal aspect of interpretation or at-
tempt to address it using tools of questionable utility, like historical dictionaries.
Our linguistic intuitions about usage and meaning in our own time and our own
speech community can be highly unreliable. But this problem is amplified when
we are interpreting a text that dates from a period of which we have no linguistic
memory or experience. To the extent that the law wishes to take into account the
meaning of a text at the time of its enactment, some empirical measure of his-
torical usage is necessary and corpus linguistics presents itself as an attractive
option.
Of course, historical data from linguistic corpora face the same challenges
that contemporary data face. If it is not clear whether carrying a firearm on one's
person or carrying a firearm in an automobile would be perceived as two distinct
senses in contemporary usage, it may not be clear from historical data either.
Moreover, while we may be able to address the sense division problem using
other linguistic empirical methods (discussed below), these methods generally
involve attempting to measure the perceptions of living, human study partici-
pants. In many cases of historical interpretation, test subjects from the relevant
speech community will not be available. In a historical context, corpus data may
not just be a type of linguistic evidence; it may be the only type available.
d. Whose Meaning?
Corpus linguistics allows us to take account of variations in usage among
different speech communities and linguistic registers. Because the interpretive
problems addressed above have to do with the interpretation of federal stat-
utes -written texts meant to be applied broadly to the population of the United
States - we have relied on linguistic corpora that present evidence of usage from
standard written American English.
Linguistic corpora are not limited to broad-based, standardized dialects or
speech communities. We can well imagine interpretive problems that require ap-
peal to language data from more narrowly drawn speech communities (includ-
ing language use from different geographical regions) and registers (including
language use from different professions or industries). Corpora can be created
and corpus data made available to address questions of interpretation from these
narrowly drawn speech communities and registers.
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But sometimes the public will interpret statutory language in pragmatic con-
text differently than a legislative body would interpret it. And that implicates the
"whose meaning" and "speech community" questions.
The speech community question, as we have noted, has implications for the
selection of a relevant corpus. If we are trying to measure intended meaning, we
might want to gather data from a corpus of a community of speakers who look
demographically like Congress. Yet if we are interested in public meaning, we
would want to turn to a broader corpus.
What if our sense of public meaning differs from our sense of intended
meaning? If that happens we would need to decide which data set to rely on.
That is a problem for legal theory - and essentially a choice of which of two sets
of justifications for the "standard picture" we seek to vindicate. In the Muscarello
setting, the answer may well be the fair notice rationale. The law of interpreta-
tion may already have given that answer in the rule of lenity. In criminal cases
the rule of lenity suggests that the notice rationale predominates. It indicates that
a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt in cases of ambiguity
as to the law's communicative content.
The question may be harder to answer in civil cases. But again, that is a prob-
lem for legal theory. As above, we will simply say for now that transparent an-
swers are better than opaque ones. Further thinking on this problem is needed.
Yet surely we will be better off with an open, transparent discussion about
whether (and when) to give primacy to intended meaning and when to credit
public meaning. Once we speak more carefully about the meaning we are looking
for and proceed more reliably in trying to measure it, we can have a better dia-
logue about these difficult questions of legal theory.
2. Conclusions
Here we offer some data-backed conclusions about the ordinary sense of ve-
hicles in the park, carrying a firearm, interpreter, and harboring an alien. In so do-
ing, we highlight strengths of the corpus analysis while also acknowledging
some drawbacks and unresolved questions.
In each of the test cases, we start with a premise of ordinary meaning that is
susceptible to both definition and measurement. The premise is that the ordi-
nary sense of a term is that which occurs most frequently in a properly controlled
linguistic context- namely, a context that controls for relevant syntactic and se-
mantic considerations, that is aimed at the relevant speech community, and that
is limited to the appropriate time frame. In other words, the sense of a word that
is most frequent (after taking semantic factors into account) is prima facie also
the sense most likely to avoid unfair notice (public meaning) and to vindicate




Yet we also recognize some possible grounds for questioning this prima facie
showing. One possible response would be to question the viability of the relevant
sense division-to suggest that the less frequent sense is just the dodo bird (an
unusual example of a bird, but no less a bird). Another would be to identify
pragmatic considerations that are not adequately assessed through a corpus
search. In circumstances in which either of these concerns is present, we think
the conclusion that the most frequent sense of a term is the ordinary one may be
in doubt. In that event, we may turn to alternative means of empirical analysis
(discussed below) or, ultimately, considerations that go to legal content rather
than communicative content.
a. Vehicles
Based on the common collocates of vehicle and our analysis of its use in con-
cordance lines, we can conclude that the most common sense of this term is in
reference to automobiles. Airplanes and bicycles appear on our frequency con-
tinuum: they are attested in the data as possible examples of vehicle. But they are
unusual -not the most frequent and not even common. If we accept the most
common use of the word as the ordinary meaning, we can conclude that the or-
dinary meaning of vehicle is automobile.
We can also make a strong case for crediting the most common meaning as
the ordinary one, in that it will best avoid unfair surprise (public meaning) and
vindicate the presumed intent of the lawmaker (intended meaning). A decision
to extend the law to bicycles or airplanes could upset reliance interests of those
who - according to the data - are likely to think of automobiles when they read
the law prohibiting vehicles. And the data give us no reason to think that those
who enacted this prohibition were thinking of airplanes, bicycles, or toy cars. In
our view, this weighs against treating these examples as falling under the ordi-
nary sense of vehicle. But, as discussed above, that is a question for legal theory.
A similar question for legal theory concerns the ambulance question. Again,
ambulance is attested as a vehicle in the corpus data. Ambulance also easily fits
within the ordinary (automobile) sense of vehicle. So the question here is one of
intended meaning or pragmatic public meaning - another question for legal the-
ory.
What about golf carts? We found no examples of golf carts as vehicles in the
corpus. But does that mean they do not qualify under the ordinary meaning of
vehicle? Like the ambulance, a golf cart shares a number of features with the most
common vehicles: automobiles. On the other hand, we would not expect to see
a lot of golf carts on the Autobahn. The question whether a golf cart fits into the
ordinary meaning of vehicle (an ordinary meaning that the corpus data tells us is
the automotive use of vehicle) is accordingly a difficult one. It turns on the viability
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of the sense divisions at work- on whether the golf cart is an unusual example
or perceived as a distinct linguistic construct. That is not an easy question to
answer. It depends, as noted in Part II above, on the sufficient conditions for the
automobile sense of vehicle.
There is more than one way to answer questions like this one. One way
would be through further corpus analysis. With sufficient corpus data, we could
assemble a list of criteria for things we speak of as an automobile, and then ask
whether a golf cart has those criteria.2 57
In addition to corpus analysis, there are other empirical linguistic techniques
that could be employed. One alternative may be empirical methods employed in
the field of psycholinguistics. Psycholinguists use a variety of experimental tech-
niques in order to measure how we perceive and interpret language, including
cross-modal priming,258 visual world paradigm analysis,25 9 and eye tracking
during reading.260 Yet it is costly to design and implement psycholinguistic ex-
periments of this sort; both specialized equipment and a high degree of expertise
are required. While psycholinguistic approaches to ordinary meaning are prom-
ising, the current hurdles are significant.
257. Possible criteria, for example, would likely include a steering wheel, motor, wheels for passage
on land, and seats for passengers. If those are the criteria, then a golf cart might count. But
we can also imagine other criteria, like usual usage on paved roads or highways, or licensure
by the state motor vehicle division. And if those are the criteria, then a golf cart might not
count.
258. Simon Garrod, Psycholinguistic Research Methods, in 1o ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE & LIN-
GUISTICS 251, 252 (Keith Brown et al. eds., 2d ed. 20o6) ("Cross-modal priming can indicate
the immediate interpretation of an ambiguous word, such as bug, in contexts that promote
either one or other meaning of the word (e.g., 'insect' or 'listening device'). As participants
listen to bug in the different contexts, they are presented with a written word (ANT or SPY)
or a nonword (AST) and have to decide as quickly as possible whether the target is a word or
not (this is called lexical decision).").
259. Id. at 253 (explaining that the visual world paradigm uses eye-tracking technology to measure
"the focus of attention correspond[ing] to the words being looked at [at] any time or it can
be used to measure which part of a scene a participant attends to as they interpret spoken
utterances about that scene").
260. Id. at 254 ("Eyetracking has been used to study a wide range of linguistic processes, including
lexical access, resolving lexical ambiguities, syntactic analysis, and various discourse pro-
cessing phenomena, such as anaphora resolution. It is particularly effective in determining
precisely when the reader makes a decision about some aspect of the linguistic input during




Cognitive linguists26 1 and sociolinguists262 assemble language data through
surveys or interviews with test subjects. Analysts in these fields may view the
mind's conception of words as "represented in cognition not as a set of criterial
features with clear-cut boundaries but rather in terms of prototype (the clearest
cases, best examples) of the category."263 in an important study, participants
ranked words as "good examples" of particular categories, including toys, fruits,
birds, weapon, and vehicle,264 and demonstrated "high agreement" on these rank-
ings.265 Chair was found to be a more prototypical example of furniture than
stool,266 automobile was found to be a more prototypical vehicle than yacht,2 6 7 and
robin was found to be a more prototypical bird than ostrich.268
Similar survey methodologies have been employed to address questions of
ordinary meaning, both in statutory interpretation 2 6 9 and the interpretation of
contracts. 2 7 0 Yet there are significant barriers to using survey data to address
questions of ordinary meaning. If we want to find meaning as of the date of a
statute's enactment, we will never be able to measure it through survey data. And
survey data is notoriously susceptible to context effects and response bias.27 1
261. Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert Cuyckens, Introducing Cognitive Linguistics, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 3, 3 (Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert Cuyckens eds., 2010) (ex-
plaining that cognitive linguistics is a linguistic discipline that "focuses on language as an
instrument for organizing, processing, and conveying information" and as "the analysis of the
conceptual and experiential basis of linguistic categories").
262. BERNARD SPOLSKY, SOCIOLINGUISTICS 3 (1998) ("Sociolinguistics is the field that studies the
relation between language and society, between the uses of language and the social structures
in which the users of language live.").
263. Rosch, supra note 46, at 193.
264. Id. at 197-98.
265. Id. at 198.
266. Id. at 229.
267. Id. at 230.
268. Id. at 232.
269. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1599-1601
(1994); J.P. Sevilla, Measuring Ordinary Meaning Using Surveys (Sept. 28, 2014) (un-
published manuscript), http://papers.ssm.com/abstract id=2466667 [http://perma.cc
/BK82-GM2C].
270. Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and Experiments
(Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 791, 2017), http://chicagounbound
.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2464&context= lawandeconomics [http://
perma.cc/Z8JY-CTG8].
271. See Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Em-
pirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. Scl. & TECH. L. REv. 156, 202 (2011) (discussing the
limitations of survey data when applied to questions of ordinary meaning).
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Nevertheless, these alternative empirical linguistic methods provide possible ap-
proaches to addressing questions of ordinary meaning beyond the use of corpus
linguistics.
The limitations of the empirical methods discussed here may be prohibitive.
They may lead us to conclude that we cannot give a conclusive answer to the
question of whether the ordinary understanding of vehicle extends to the golf
cart- or to related questions about go-karts or four-wheelers. At that point it
may be time to abandon the standard picture - to fall back on "fake" answers
giving legal content to the law that is not necessarily in line with its communi-
cative content. That seems fine, but as a fallback. As our sense of the law's com-
municative content becomes less clear, the reasons for crediting it are much
weaker. Our point is just that this should not be the law's first instinct.
b. Carrying a Firearm
The corpus data tend to support the dissenting position in Muscarello. In
both the NOW Corpus and the COHA, the vast majority of concordance lines
involved the bearing on your person sense of carry. That gives us some meaningful
empirical data about language usage. It tells us that when people speak of carry-
ing a firearm they are almost always talking about carrying it on their person.
That provides a prima facie basis for concluding that the ordinary communica-
tive content of the mandatory minimum sentencing provision in § 924(c) (1) is
limited to the personally bearing notion of carry.
Solan and Tammy Gales might observe that the data may merely be an arti-
fact of the greater commonality of the personally bearing notion of carrying in the
real world.2 72 That is probably correct, but not necessarily a reason to distrust
the data. If most every time we speak of carrying a firearm we are talking about
personally bearing it, then the first sense of carrying to come to mind is likely to
be that sense. Extending the statute to the transporting in a car sense may there-
fore jeopardize significant reliance interests.
That leaves, as above, the question of whether bearing and transporting are
two distinct linguistic constructs or just alternative examples within the same
construct. Again, we could test this by further empirical analysis -by finding
(through corpus or other empirical linguistic study) the sufficient conditions of
carrying, and asking whether bearing and transporting both qualify.
Perhaps we will not ultimately find a satisfactory answer to this question in
any empirical data. But even then the data will have been helpful. They will allow
us to avoid the smokescreen grounds for assessments of ordinariness articulated




by the competing opinions in Muscarello, and provide a sufficient basis for turn-
ing to other means of assessment.
One such means could be an attempt to assess intended meaning. This in-
quiry may be a difficult one, as noted above. But again, at least a decision on this
basis will be a transparent one -rooted in a disagreement about whether Con-
gress was likely concerned only about firearms on a drug dealer's person, or
might also have been concerned about guns within relative reach in the dealer's
vehicle. That sort of debate may seem an empty one to a judge seeking determi-
nacy in the ordinary meaning of the text; but where such meaning is indetermi-
nate, this debate seems preferable to a completely fabricated answer -like one
rooted in a dictionary or etymology.
c. Interpreter
The data seem to provide support for Justice Alito's majority view in Tanigu-
chi. We did not find a single instance of interpreter in the context of text-to-text
written translation in the concordance lines we reviewed in the NOW Corpus.
That strongly indicates that this is not the kind of interpreter that first comes to
mind when we use this term.
That leaves the same question highlighted in the other examples: whether
the written translator sense would be perceived as separate from the oral translator
notion.273 Here we see reason to suspect that these are just alternative examples
of a single linguistic construct. There is at least some indication of that in the fact
that some lexicographers treat these as just alternative examples of a single
sense.274 And, again, that is likely a question that could be tested empirically.
We have not sought to study intended meaning in our corpus analysis. But
as noted above we think such a study is possible. One approach would be to
think of interpreter as a term used by lawmakers, and to look for evidence of usage
in this speech community. If we assembled such evidence, then we could have
273. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 580 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(asserting that " [d] istinguishing written from oral translation" is a "dubious" endeavor, not-
ing that "some translation tasks do not fall neatly into one category or another," and asserting
that an oral interpreter "may be called upon to 'sight translate' a written document").
274. See id. (" [A]s the Court acknowledges, ante, at [567-568], and n. 2, 'interpreters' is more than
occasionally used to encompass those who translate written speech as well. See Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1182 (1976) (hereinafter Web-
ster's) (defining 'interpreter' as 'one that translates; esp: a person who translates orally for
parties conversing in different tongues'); Black's Law Dictionary 895 ( 9 th ed. 2009) (defining
'interpreter' as a 'person who translates, esp. orally, from one language to another'); Ballen-
tine's Law Dictionary 655 (3d ed. 1969) (defining 'interpreter' as '[o]ne who interprets, par-
ticularly one who interprets words written or spoken in a foreign language')." (alteration in
original)).
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the debate flagged above - as to whether intended meaning should win out over
public meaning, or whether they ought to collapse together as a matter of theory.
d. Harbor
Our harbor data seem inconclusive. We found a significant number of in-
stances of both the conceal sense and the shelter sense of this term. That suggests
that both senses are common and attested. To the extent we regard the ordinary
meaning as a common or attested sense, then the data indicate that both are "or-
dinary." To the extent we regard the ordinary meaning as the most common
sense of a word, however, the data appear to indicate that neither sense is "ordi-
nary.
It is hard to know what conclusion to draw from these inferences (even ac-
cepting that we have a statistical basis for doing so). One possibility is to say that
both senses are ordinary in that they are both commonly attested. This is pre-
sumably the dissenting view in Costello, and in line with the approach at least
sometimes taken on the "carry" question in Muscarello (that both personal car-
rying and car carrying count as ordinary).
Another alternative is simply to abandon our search for the "standard pic-
ture." If we lack probative data on the most frequent sense of a given term, we
may conclude that we cannot determine the ordinary communicative content of
the law - and thus that we need a "fake" answer, like that provided by the rule of
lenity. Yet even here the data will have proven useful. The application of the rule
of lenity requires an antecedent finding that the criminal statute is ambiguous -
that the words of the statute are susceptible of two competing interpretations.2 75
Often, such determinations are highly impressionistic.2 76 Here, the antecedent
finding of ambiguity necessary to the application of the rule of lenity is based
not on intuitions or dictionaries, but on quantifiable data about real-world us-
age - data that establishes that both senses of harbor are attested and compara-
tively common. The standard picture here yields to the law of interpretation, but
only after the necessary work has been done.
275. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 500-01 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("When a penal
statute is susceptible of two interpretations, the one more favorable to the defendant must be
chosen unless 'text, structure, and history . . . establish that the [harsher] position is unam-
biguously correct.' (alteration in original)).
276. Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, AmbiguityAboutAmbiguity: An Empirical
Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 276 (2010) (" [T]here is no avoiding
the fact that impressionistic judgments are doing important work. Some judges read the text




IV. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
We have little doubt of the need and basis for corpus linguistic analysis of
ordinary meaning. But we anticipate - and already have seen- significant objec-
tions to the use of these new tools of interpretation. In a few recent cases, judges
have proffered corpus linguistic analysis in support of their assessment of the
ordinary meaning of statutory terms.2 77 Some of these attempts have prompted
doubt and criticism from fellow judges.2 78 And even the judges who have advo-
cated for this approach (present company included) have acknowledged cause
for concern and care in this endeavor.279
The criticisms that we have considered fall into three categories: proficiency,
propriety, and practicality. Each concern has an element of viability but crumbles
under careful scrutiny.
After addressing these concerns, we close with some observations about the
potential role for corpus linguistic analysis going forward - about the extent to
which corpus data can address the deficiencies in the ordinary meaning analysis
highlighted herein. We also highlight the ideological or theoretical neutrality of
this methodology, explaining why corpus analysis is not just for textualists (or
originalists), but for anyone who takes language seriously.
A. Proficiency: Judges (and Lawyers) Can't Do Corpus Linguistics
Judges and lawyers are not linguists. Most all of us, at least, are not profes-
sionally trained ones. From that premise it is easy to jump to the conclusion that
judges and lawyers should leave the linguistic analysis to professional linguists -
meaning, in practice, to expert witness reports or testimony. A majority of the
Utah Supreme Court has so concluded in recent cases.280
277. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016); State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, 356
P.3d 1258 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); J.M.W. v.
T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 2011 UT 38, 266 P.3d 702 (Lee, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
278. See, e.g., Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, 356 P.3 d 1258; In re Adoption ofBaby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, 266 P.3 d
702.
279. See, e.g., Rasabout, 2015 UT ¶ 97, 356 P.3d at 1282-83 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
28o. Id. ¶ 18, 356 P.3d at 1265 (majority opinion) ("The knowledge and expertise required to con-
duct scientific research are 'usually not within the common knowledge' of judges, so 'testi-
mony from relevant experts is generally required in order to ensure that [judges] have ade-
quate knowledge upon which to base their decisions."' (quoting Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT
9 ¶ 7, 179 P.3 d 754, 755-56)); In reAdoption ofBaby E.Z., 2011 UT ¶ 19 n.2, 266 P.3 d at 708 n.2
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The "proficiency" critique has some bite. For reasons noted above, we con-
cede that corpus linguistics is not "plug and play" analysis. Corpus data can be
gathered and analyzed properly only with care and a little background and train-
ing in the underlying methodology. Ajudge who proceeds willy-nilly may, either
consciously or unwittingly, proffer data that has only the appearance of careful
empiricism.28 1 For these and other reasons we wholeheartedly agree that the ju-
dicial analysis of ordinary meaning will be improved in cases in which the parties
or their experts proffer corpus analysis that can be tested by the adversary sys-
tem.
2 8 2
So we take the "proficiency" critique as an appropriate word of warning.
Judges should acknowledge the pitfalls and limitations of the tool of corpus lin-
guistics. They should not overstate its utility, ignore the care required to use it
properly, or overlook the potential for subjectivity or even strategic manipula-
tion.
But that is as far as this critique can take us. The fact of the matter is that
judges and lawyers are linguists. We may not be trained in linguistic methodol-
ogy, but our work puts us consistently and inevitably in the position of resolving
ambiguities in legal language. Judges and lawyers are experts, in other words, in
interpreting the law.28 3 So the question, ultimately, is not whether we trust
judges to engage in linguistic analysis. It is whether we want them to "do so with
("Unless this linguistic 'context' is placed in its proper context, it is of little analytical or per-
suasive value.").
281. See Rasabout, 2015 UT ¶ 21, 356 P.3 d at 1266 (noting that a potentially significant portion of
corpus data "require [s] an interpretive assumption" or retains some level of ambiguity); Mi-
chael Stubbs, Corpus Semantics, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SEMANTICS 106, 107 (Nick
Riemer ed., 2016) (noting that "a constant background question is whether a corpus can ever,
strictly speaking, provide semantic data, since intuition is always required to interpret the
data,' but concluding that "corpora allow us to study language 'with a degree of objectivity
[ ... ] where before we could only speculate"' (quoting Adam Kilgarriff, Putting Frequencies
in the Dictionary, 10 INT'LJ. LEXICOGRAPHY 135, 137 (1997))); Ben Zimmer, The Corpus in the
Court: 'Like Lexis on Steroids,'ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national
/archive/2011/o3/the-corpus-in-the-court-like-lexis-on-steroids/72054 [http://perma.cc
/KBQ5-BSQ4] ("While the corpus revolution promises to put judicial inquiries into language
patterns on a firmer, more systematic footing, the results are still prey to all manner of human
interpretation.").
282. Rasabout, 2015 UT ¶ 97, 356 P.3d at 1287 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (agreeing that judicial analysis of any kind is "better when adversary
briefing is complete and in-depth").
283. Id. ¶ 107, 356 P.3d at 1285 (explaining that although they do not have "the kind of training




the aid of- instead of in open ignorance of or rebellion to - modern tools devel-
oped to facilitate that analysis."284
Judges are likewise not historians. And it may rightly be said that many law-
yers and judges are even "bad historians" that tend to "make up an imaginary
history and use curiously unhistorical methods."2 85 As one of us recently noted,
"[J]udges of all stripes engage in historical analysis, particularly in their inter-
pretation of the [C]onstitution."28 6 "So the response to our lack of historical
training is not to back away from the enterprise; it is to arm ourselves with the
tools necessary to do the best history we can."28 7
The same goes for linguistic analysis. "We could continue to judge the ordi-
nary meaning of words based on intuition, aided by the dictionary. But those
tools are problematic."288 Thus "it is our current methodology and tools that in-
volve bad linguistics produced by unscientific methods." 289 Therefore, " [i] f the
concern is reliability, the proper response is to embrace - and not abandon - cor-
pus-based analysis. "290
The potential for subjectivity and arbitrariness is not heightened but reduced
by the use of corpus linguistics. 29 1 Without this tool, judges will tap into their
linguistic memory to make assessments about the frequency or prototypicality
of a given sense of a statutory term. Such recourse to memory and judicial intu-
ition is neither transparent nor replicable. Nothing is statistically worse than one
data point - especially a biased one. The potential for motivated reasoning is ev-
ident.292
284. Id.
285. MAx RADIN, LAW As LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 138 (1940).
286. Rasabout, 2015 UT ¶ 109, 356 P.3 d at 1285 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
287. Id.
288. Id. ¶ 112, 356 P.3 d at 1285.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. As one of us has noted, while a judge may "go looking for supporting evidence in a corpus,' it
is possible that "after reviewing a few hundred concordance lines, a salient meaning contrary
to the judge's initial conclusion becomes harder to ignore." Mouritsen, supra note 271, at 202.
292. A common critique of the use of legislative history comes to mind: "It sometimes seems that
citing legislative history is still, as [Judge] Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to 'looking
over a crowd and picking out your friends."' Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOwAL. REV. 195, 214 (1983). A parallel
problem appears in cases in which judges summon examples of word usage in literary works.
See, e.g., Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785, 788 (2015) (interpreting the ordinary mean-
ing of "to accompany" using a host of sources, including quotes from a Jane Austen as well as
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Corpus linguistics, by contrast, facilitates transparency and scrutiny.29 3 It is
"an empirical check on our (imperfect) linguistic intuition."294 And it is not, ul-
timately, a terribly complex or difficult endeavor. "Corpus analysis is like
math" -everyone can do it at some basic level; at more advanced levels it be-
comes too complicated for all but the experts.2 95 We're advocating rudimentary
linguistic analysis that most anyone can do.2 96 We "just think we should be using
a calculator instead of doing it in our heads."29 7
The path forward is for judges and lawyers to identify the corpus analysis
that we can perform sufficiently and reliably to supplement the tools we are now
using (and the sort of analysis we must leave to linguists). In time, the law and
corpus linguistics movement will develop standards and best practices for this
field. Until then we should proceed cautiously and carefully in a direction that
will allow us to be the best linguists we can. Paraphrasing an observation made
by Justice Scalia and his co-author Garner regarding judges performing histori-
cal analysis, we may or may not be able to do corpus linguistics with the precision
of an expert, but "[o]ur charge is to try." 2 9 8
B. Propriety: Judges Shouldn't Do Corpus Linguistics
The law puts limits on judicial analysis of matters that exceed the bounds of
the briefing and record in a particular case. Our rules of judicial ethics say that
"[a] judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently," but shall "con-
sider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially
a Charles Dickens novel). That kind of data cherry-picking is fraught with risk of hindsight
bias or motivated reasoning.
293. See Mouritsen, supra note 271, at 203 (" [C]orpus analysis brings these subconscious assump-
tions about language and meaning out in the open."); Zimmer, supra note 281 ("[A]t least
these ideological arguments can proceed on a basis of concrete facts about how we use lan-
guage, rather than on a welter of idiosyncratic assumptions, as has too often been the case.").
294. Rasabout, 2015 UT ¶ 66, 356 P.3d at 1277 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
295. Id. ¶ 115, 356 P.3d at 1286.
296. While the COIA and similar linguist-designed corpora are more foreign than Google or
Westlaw, they are being employed in the same way. In short, we are advocating using a corpus
as a search tool or database to find uses of language that are as easy to read as a Google search
result. The results are just more reliable.
297. Rasabout, 2015 UT ¶ 115, 356 P.3d at 1286 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).




noticed."299 With this in mind, a majority of the Utah Supreme Court has chal-
lenged the "sua sponte" use of corpus linguistics as falling beyond the proper
domain of the judge. 00
The analogy here may arguably be to cases in which judges perform their
own experiments to assess the factual assertions of the parties in a particular case.
A prominent example appears in Judge Posner's opinion in Mitchell v. JCG In-
dustries.' 1 A question in that case was how long it took poultry processing work-
ers to change in and out of the safety clothing they used to do their jobs. Judge
Posner's opinion included a reference to an experiment he conducted on that
question in chambers -in which he ordered the clothing in question and asked
"three members of the court's staff" to change in and out of it "as they would do
if they were workers at the plant."3 02 "Their endeavors were videotaped,"0 3 and
"[t]he videotape automatically recorded the time consumed in donning and
doffing and also enabled verification that the 'workers' were neither rushing nor
dawdling."3 04 Posner referred to the results of this experiment in support of "the
common sense intuition that donning and doffing a few simple pieces of clothing
and equipment do not eat up half the lunch break."3 0S
Chief Judge Wood, in dissent, asserted that the Posner majority went "be-
yond the proper appellate role" in conducting an experiment of relevance to a
factual question in the case.306 She complained that the results of Judge Posner's
experiment "cannot be considered as evidence in the case," which is limited to
matters placed in the record pursuant to applicable rules of civil procedure.0 7
This may be the paradigm that critics of corpus linguistics have in mind
when they question the viability of sua sponte use of this tool. The governing
rules of judicial ethics prohibit judges from "investigat[ing] facts in a matter in-
dependently" and only allow the courts to consider "facts that may properly be
judicially noticed."a3 0 But the analogy is inapt. Judges who consider corpus data
299. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9(C) (AM. BARAss'N 2011).
300. Rasabout, 2015 UT ¶ 17, 356 P.3d at 1264-65 (majority opinion).
301. 745 F.3d 837 (7 th Cir. 2014).




306. Id. at 847 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 849.
308. UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9(C) (2017); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r.
2.9(C) (AM. BARAss'N 2011).
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in assessing the ordinary meaning of a statute are not investigating the adjudica-
tive facts of a case; they are considering facts of relevance to the proper interpre-
tation of the law. These are known as legislative facts, and their investigation is
the inevitable - and quite proper - domain of the judge's sua sponte analysis.
The point is supported by the law of evidence. Governing rules of evidence
typically state that limitations on the judge's judicial notice power are addressed
to "an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact."' The distinction is this:
" [L]egislative facts are matters that go to the policy of a rule of law as distinct
from the true facts that are used in the adjudication of a controversy.""1 0 Such
facts "are not appropriate for a rule of evidence.""' They are "best left to the law-
making considerations by appellate and trial courts."31 And that is precisely
what is involved in the corpus linguistic analysis of the meaning of statutory text.
Corpus analysis has nothing to do with adjudicative facts - with the who, what,
when, or where of an underlying controversy. It has only to do with the proper
construction of the applicable law. For that reason, there is no ethical or eviden-
tiary prohibition on sua sponte corpus analysis by a judge. 1
"A contrary conclusion would call into question a wide range of" inquiries
routinely conducted by our courts, including the use of dictionaries:314
If we were foreclosed from considering outside material that informs our
resolution of open questions of law, we would be barred from engaging
in historical analysis relevant to a question of original meaning of a pro-
vision of the [C]onstitution, or from considering social science literature
309. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) ("This rule governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a leg-
islative fact."); UTAH R. EVID. 201(a) (same).
310. UTAH R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee note; see also Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to
Problems ofEvidence in theAdministrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364,402-03 (1942) ("When
an agency wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively, just as judges have
created the common law through judicial legislation, and the facts which inform its legislative
judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts. The distinction is important;
the traditional rules of evidence are designed for adjudicative facts, and unnecessary confusion
results from attempting to apply the traditional rules to legislative facts.").
311. UTAH R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee note.
312. Id.
313. For further commentary on the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts, see, for
example, Bulova Watch Co. v. Hattori & Co., 5o8 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), which
explains that the "court's power to resort to less well known and accepted sources of data to
fill in the gaps of its knowledge for legislative and general evidential hypothesis purposes must
be accepted because it is essential to the judicial process." See also ROBERTE. KEETON, JUDGING
38-39 (1990) (discussing the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts).
314. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72 ¶ 106, 356 P.3 d 1258, 1285 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in




in resolving a difficult question under the common law. Linguistic anal-
ysis is no different; to the extent we charge our judges with resolving
ambiguities in language, we cannot (and do not) reasonably restrict their
ability to do so on a well-informed basis - even on grounds not presented
by the parties, and not within the domain of judges' professional train-
ing.
For better or worse, judges do that all the time. State court judges decide
questions of common law that require us to consider and weigh questions im-
plicating literature in fields of social science about which we are hardly ex-
perts.31 No one bats an eye when judges do their own research and thinking on
a broad range of "legislative facts." The matter should be no different for linguis-
tic analysis of ordinary meaning.
C. Practicality: Corpus Linguistics Will Impose an Unbearable Burden
The widespread use of corpus linguistics could put a strain on parties and
the courts. This is another criticism that has appeared in majority opinions in
the Utah Supreme Court. The argument is that turning the analysis of ordinary
meaning into an empirical, data-driven enterprise will introduce the "dueling
expert" problem and make statutory cases more costly and time-consuming.' 1 7
The effects of the proliferation of expert testimony are a matter meriting careful
consideration. For every question on which we require expert analysis, we com-
pound the expense and time it takes for a case to be resolved. We should not do
that without a good reason.
Yet we find this objection to corpus analysis unpersuasive for several reasons.
First is the fact that not all problems of statutory interpretation lend themselves
to corpus linguistic analysis. The utility of this tool, as currently conceived, is
limited to problems of lexical ambiguity - of a contest between two meanings of
the terms of the statutory text. That excludes a category of problems of semantic
(or in other words structural ambiguity) - a problem, for example, as to whether
a modifier is understood to apply to all items in a statutory list or only the "last
315- Id.
316. Recent examples in the Utah Supreme Court include the question whether a medical practi-
tioner owes a duty to third parties who are foreseeably injured by the negligent prescription
of pharmaceuticals, B.R. & C.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2010 UT 11, 275 P-3 d 228; and the question
of the appropriate age at which a child may be required to defend against a claim for negli-
gence, Nielsen ex rel. C.N. v. Bell ex rel. B.B., 2016 UT 14, 370 P.3d 925.
317. Rasabout, 2015 UT ¶ 19, 356 P.3 d at 1265 (majority opinion).
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antecedent.""' Even as to the class of cases of lexical ambiguity, moreover, not
all cases will call for corpus analysis. In our view " [c]orpus analysis is something
of a last resort.""' "It comes into play only if we find that the legislature is not
using words in some specialized sense, and only if we cannot reject one of the
parties' definitions based on the structure or context of the statute."3 20 This
yields a limited but important domain for corpus linguistics. Judges should turn
to an empirical analysis of frequency only in cases in which they have "no better
way" of resolving a contest between probabilities of meaning.32 1 That is a rela-
tively rare case.322
Second, corpus-based analysis will not always require an expert. This "isn't
rocket science."323 Lawyers are crafty, ingenious creatures with the capacity to
learn and even master new tools, technologies, and methodologies. Witness the
way attorneys have learned to parse historical materials and present them when
litigating the original meaning of the Constitution. In a way, lawyers have been
doing corpus analysis for a long time; they scour Westlaw or Lexis to determine
how courts have interpreted a phrase or concept. So it is undoubtedly true that
lawyers will have to bone up on some basic linguistic methodology. But contin-
uing education is an ongoing element of the legal profession. And a familiarity
with and capacity for corpus analysis can take root just like Westlaw and Lexis
searches did.324 The rising generation of millennials is particularly suited to the
318. See Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 962 (2016) (describing the "rule of the last an-
tecedent" and applying it to interpret a statute imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on
defendants who violate the federal child pornography statute and have previously been con-
victed of certain crimes); CRUSE, supra note 125, at 107-08 ("Ambiguity has been presented
here as a lexical phenomenon; it is important to emphasize, however, that there are other
sources of ambiguity. One of these, of course, is syntax, as in Mary saw the man with the tele-
scope. Many syntactic ambiguities arise from the possibility of alternative constituent struc-
tures, as here: with the telescope is either a manner adverbial modifying saw, or a prepositional
phrase modifying the man.").
319. Rasabout, 2015 UT ¶ 118, 356 P.3 d at 1286 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. ¶ 118, 356 P.3d at 1287 (asserting that in "five years" on the Utah Supreme Court, Associate
Chief Justice Lee had "employed such analysis only a very few times,' and that " [i] n the many
other statutory cases" that have arisen, he "disposed of the matter using more traditional tools
of interpretation").
323. Id. ¶ 114, 356 P.3 d at 1286.
324. The advent of computer-aided legal research is now an accepted staple. But it wasn't always
thought to be so. Early reactions paralleled some of the responses to corpus linguistics. See,
e.g., Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PRAC. &




task. They have never known life without a computer, and are constantly em-
bracing new applications and tools for computer analysis. In time we may see
competing corpus presentations as a matter of course in adversary briefing.32 5
There will often be no need for dueling experts, just as there is often no need for
dueling historical experts in constitutional litigation, or dueling dictionary ex-
perts on a statutory question.
Finally, if in the rare case there is a need for the parties to retain corpus lin-
guistic experts, that is hardly cause for alarm. Where the issue is complex enough
and the stakes are high enough, expert analysis could be helpful - and certainly
preferable to deciding a matter as significant as, say, the applicability of a federal
sentencing enhancement on the basis of an unreliable source like a dictionary or
an opaque one like a judge's intuition. Some problems are important enough to
merit expert analysis. We should leave that matter to the marketplace - to the
clients and lawyers who decide how best to formulate and present a legal posi-
tion.
D. Corpus Data Represents Only "More Factually Common Iterations"
Solan and Gales have observed that corpus data may reflect only the fact that
a given sense of a certain term is a more factually common iteration of that term
move into legal information"); Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like
a Lawyer in the Computer Age, 88 LAw LIBR. J. 338, 339 (1996) (warning that computer-aided
legal research will undermine the ability to think like a lawyer); Molly Warner Lien, Techno-
centrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 85-86 (1998) (arguing
that computer-aided legal research "may be harmful to the process of legal reasoning" and
that lawyers should be aware of the "negative impacts" of using technology in this way); Scott
P. Stolley, Shortcomings of Technology: The Corruption of Legal Research, FOR THE DEFENSE 39
(Apr. 2004) (viewing the likes of LexisNexis and Westlaw as leading to a generation of law-
yers who can't find cases on point). Most of us view this criticism as downright silly today.
We realize that computer research tools can be misused, and may be improved if supple-
mented by more traditional methods. But they cannot properly be rejected on the basis of
their unfamiliarity.
325. This will hold if, but only if, our courts continue to embrace this methodology-as has hap-
pened recently in Michigan. If we (judges) build it, they (attorneys) will surely come. See
Appellants' (Third) Supplemental Authority, In re Estate of Cliffiman, 892 N.W.2d 380 (Mich.
2017) (No. 67-151998), 2016 WL 4480882 (submitting supplemental authority with exhibits
"show[ing] the relative frequency with which the words or word combinations appear in the
COCA database," and noting that " [i]n Harris, this Court approved the use of the corpus lin-
guistics in determining the common usage and meaning of statutorily undefined words"). But
lawyers need not wait on the courts to begin incorporating corpus analysis in their briefing.
Courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have already proven amenable to well-
executed corpus-based analysis. See Zimmer, supra note 281 (discussing Neal Goldfarb's influ-
ential, corpus-based amicus brief in FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011)).
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in the real world.326 If that is true, there may be reason to doubt the probity of
the data in establishing the semantic meaning3 27 perceived by lawmakers or the
public.
These are important concerns. And anyone turning to corpus analysis would
do well to consider these limitations before jumping too quickly to an inference
about ordinary meaning. But we do not view the sense-division problems noted
here to be fatal to the probity of corpus linguistic analysis (even for related senses
of a statutory term). We propose a range of responses to this concern.
First, the Solan- Gales point seems overstated. Let's apply it to the carry data.
It may be likely, as Solan and Gales might suggest, that the corpus data we found
is indicative of the fact that most iterations of carrying a firearm in the real world
involve personally bearing it. Yet we do not see that as depriving the data of pro-
bative value. If most iterations of firearm carrying involve personally bearing,
then that sense of carrying seems likely to be the one that first comes to mind
when we think of this term. That top-of-mind sense, as noted, may not exhaust
the breadth of human perception of this term. If pressed, some people might
concede that the term encompasses the transport sense too. As discussed below,
there may be a way to measure such perceptions of meaning.
This raises the question of whether to credit only the top-of-mind sense or a
possibly broader, "reflective" sense as ordinary. But this is not a deficiency in
corpus data - or even in linguistic theory. It is a question for law -"we have to
decide which meaning, produced by which theory of meaning, we ought to
pick."328 We think the answers to these questions are dictated in part by the ra-
tionales that drive us to consider ordinary meaning. A concern for fair notice and
protection of reliance interests may well direct us to stop at the top-of-mind
sense of a statutory term. If the personally bear sense of carry is the first one that
comes to mind, then that may be the sense that the public will have in mind upon
reading the terms of a statute, and if we are interested in protecting reliance in-
terests and avoiding unfair surprise, we may want to stop short of including the
broader transport sense that the public might concede to be covered upon reflec-
tion.
We emphasize that corpus analysis does not take place in an acontextual vac-
uum. A corpus-based approach to ordinary meaning, as noted, does not simply
evaluate which of two competing uses is the most common. Instead, the corpus
326. Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation, 2017
BYU L. REv. (forthcoming 2018).
327. The point is not to suggest that mere semantic meaning is the right framing. Above we con-
ceded that the pragmatic context of relevance to so-called "intended" or "public" meaning is
the correct focus. But for now we are speaking only of semantic meaning. We add the wrinkle
of pragmatic context below.




allows us to examine the use of a word or phrase in a particular syntactic, seman-
tic, or pragmatic context, in the speech or writing of a particular speech commu-
nity or register, and at a particular point in time. Our analysis of carry, for exam-
ple, does not simply examine the use of carry at large. We look for sentences in
which the verb carry has a human agent performing the carrying and a weapon
object (firearm or one of its synonyms) being carried. We look for such instances
in what we have argued is the relevant speech community and in texts dating
from the era in which the relevant statute was enacted. With this level of granu-
larity, we are often able to find not only common ways to describe common real-
world occurrences, but also the most common ways in which highly particular-
ized and highly contextualized occurrences are described in a given speech com-
munity at a given point in time. If there are cases where "it is natural to use a
particular expression, but the circumstances do not arise often,"32 9 as Solan and
Gales suggest, an appropriately designed corpus search (performed in a suffi-
ciently robust corpus) will help us identify these instances and make informed,
evidence-based judgments about them.
Second, above we were considering data at the right end of the frequency
continuum - an indication that one of two senses is clearly the most frequent, or
even almost exclusive. But what if the data is less clear? What if the data suggests
that each of two senses is about equally possible? Or that one is a bit more fre-
quent but not clearly so?
Sometimes an indication that both senses of a term are relatively frequent will
be telling. If two senses are closely related and both appear relatively equally in
the data, that may tell us that both are about equally likely to be called to mind.
In that event it may be difficult to exclude either as extraordinary.
The salience of inconclusive data may also depend on the nature of the ques-
tion presented. We have been speaking here of isolated questions of ambiguity
and ordinary meaning. But sometimes the question of whether the language of
a statute is plain or ordinary is bound up with questions of whether or not the
court will consider extrinsic evidence of meaning like legislative history, or apply
a substantive canon, or defer to an agency interpretation. In such cases, incon-
clusive data about which meaning is ordinary may be quite conclusive -it may
tell us that there is ambiguity sufficient to proceed past the threshold "standard
picture." Corpus data can bring rigor to this range of questions too; instead of
guessing about plainness we can summon data.
In some cases, that data may be too mixed to yield any helpful answers. Even
then that does not require us to abandon the standard picture. We could, for
example, look to other empirical methods for measuring perceptions of mean-
ing. Barring that kind of help, we can fall back on a principle of interpretation
329. Solan & Gales, supra note 326 (manuscript at 3).
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framed by something other than a view of the standard picture - as in a rule of
interpretation that has to do with "legal content" of the law, like the rule of lenity.
But we see no reason to fall back too quickly. The law commits to the standard
picture for good reason. We think the courts should try their best to find real
answers to linguistic questions before falling back on fake ones.
E. Political Neutrality
A final potential concern goes to the utility of the methodology of corpus
linguistics across a range of theories of interpretation. The utility of this meth-
odology may be most apparent to the textualist or the originalist. But we see
much broader applications for corpus linguistics. We also see reason for those
who are skeptical of textualism and originalism to resort to this new tool with
equal alacrity.
The textualist finds statutory meaning in the words of a legal text. For that
reason, the textualist would have a natural affinity for a tool that promises to
help uncover the meaning of the text. That affinity would be sharpened to the
extent the tool can help deliver on the promise of determinacy- a promise at the
heart of this theory.
The originalist's expected attraction to corpus analysis rests on similar
grounds. An originalist who seeks the original public meaning of the words of
the Constitution,3 o for example, would quickly see the value of data-based an-
swers to questions previously left to more impressionistic analysis. The data
would be viewed as delivering on a core promise of originalism-"fixation,"
which is the idea that written constitutions are viewed as carrying fixed content
as of the time of their adoption.3
Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss corpus linguistic analysis as a method-
ology of likely interest only to the textualist and the originalist. Even the most
jaded skeptics of these two approaches should find this methodology significant.
A threshold reason was discussed above: even those who search for legislative
intent or purpose view the text as the "best evidence" of intent or purpose.332
330. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751, 761 (2009) (" [0]rig-
inal public meaning, in contrast to original intent, interpret[s] the Constitution according to
how the words of the document would have been understood by a competent and reasonable
speaker of the language at the time of the document's enactment .... [and] is now the pre-
dominant originalist theory.").
331. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 1 (2015).




"We're all textualists now" in that most all of us at least start with the text.' If
we're going to start with the text, we should seize the best tools for discerning
its meanng.
Yet even an avowed "anti-textualist" should be attracted to corpus linguistics,
here for an instrumental or strategic reason. A key move for the anti-textualist is
to challenge the purported determinacy of statutory text (or fixation of consti-
tutional language). Corpus analysis can often help in that endeavor.3 34  here
the data show that there is no ordinary meaning, or that there is a wide range of
ordinary meanings, the interpreter will be free to dismiss the notion of determi-
nacy (or fixation) and turn to other theories or tools of interpretation.
For these reasons, we see corpus linguistic analysis as a tool without any nec-
essary connection to a theory of interpretation or an often-corresponding polit-
ical ideology. It is a neutral tool with broad utility for anyone interested in data
of relevance to the analysis of ordinary meaning.
F Potential: The Role for Corpus Linguistic Analysis in Addressing Problems of
Ordinary Meaning
Another critique is one not yet made by critics but implicitly acknowledged
in our analysis throughout this Article. For all our bemoaning of the deficiencies
in the law's construct of ordinary meaning, and touting of the insights provided
by corpus linguistic analysis, we have not really offered our own grand theory of
corpus-based ordinary meaning. Because we acknowledge that corpus data may
at least sometimes be indeterminate, we cannot claim that corpus linguistic anal-
ysis will definitively resolve ongoing debates about the ordinary meaning of the
language of the law.
In that sense, we are left to concede that the methodology we propose is not
an answer to the many facets of the ordinary meaning problem highlighted
herein. That said, we are not shy in asserting that corpus linguistic analysis is an
essential step in improving the quality of the ordinary meaning inquiry going
forward. At a minimum, the data that can be compiled through corpus linguistic
analysis will allow lawyers and judges to have a transparent debate informed by
real data instead of inferences from sources (like dictionaries or etymology or
intuition) that are both opaque and ill-suited to the task to which they are ap-
plied. The corpus methodology that we have introduced promises three contri-
333. Kagan, supra note lo.
334. Mouritsen, supra note 271, at 161 (arguing that textualist analysis may be "vulnerable" to at-
tack from corpus data because textualist claims about meaning "can be proven true or false
using empirical linguistic methods").
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butions to ordinary meaning analysis going forward. First is a diagnostic contri-
bution: the methodology of corpus linguistics helps to identify shortcomings in
the law's current approach to identifying and assessing ordinary meaning. Sec-
ond, corpus linguistic analysis can help advance the theory of interpretation. The
tools and methodologies presented herein will aid in the development of a more
sophisticated legal conception of ordinary meaning. Third, having identified the
problem and laid out the requirements for a proposed solution, we advance the
methodology of corpus linguistics as the best mechanism for yielding a satisfac-
tory solution.
We grant that some problems of ordinary meaning will require resort to
other tools or principles of interpretation for their resolution. Where the corpus
data are inconclusive, or the distinction between two proposed definitions seems
so thin that we doubt that it represents any real difference in human perception,
we may need to look elsewhere to resolve the interpretive question presented.
But that does not mean that the corpus data were unhelpful. It means that we
looked at data- at comparatively empirical, falsifiable grounds for assessing or-
dinary communicative content -as a threshold step and decided we needed to
go further to find a satisfactory answer.
CONCLUSION
Some points of analysis outlined here are necessarily tentative. That seems
inevitable in the course of breaking new ground. We trust that some of the value
in our contribution will be to spark further analysis and scholarship on the ques-
tions we have raised.
Moving forward, judges, lawyers, and linguists will need to collaborate to
settle on some best practices in this emerging field. Some important questions
to answer include methods for selecting the best corpus for a given type of am-
biguity, standards for the appropriate sample size for a given search, standards
for determining appropriate search terms and search methods for various types
of inquiries, and the identification of suitable coding methods. Scholars have be-
gun to explore these and other related questions."' Further work is in order. But
we are confident that lawyers and linguists can work together to develop an or-
thodox set of methods that will refine an approach that is now in its infancy.
335. See James C. Phillips & Jesse A. Egbert, A Concise How-To Guidefor Law and Corpus Linguistics:
Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies To Improve
Corpus Design andAnalysis, 2017 BYU L. REv. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing that principles and
methodologies from survey and content-analysis methodologies need to be applied to corpus




Linguists have observed that corpus linguistics generally "has not yet
reached the stage where it can present a stable set of methodological procedures
coupled to specific descriptive questions."33 6 That is undoubtedly all the more
true for the application of this tool to a brand new field. The law, after all, asks
questions that linguists historically have not deemed important - concerning the
average or "ordinary" understanding of a given term in a given linguistic setting.
The methodology of corpus linguistics will undoubtedly experience growing
pains as it is employed for new purposes. Yet linguists have noted elsewhere
(more generally) that " [t] he observation that distributional corpus analysis has
not reached" the stage at which we have embraced a set of widely accepted norms
"is certainly not a reason to abandon the approach; rather, it defines a promising
and exciting research [program]."" That is certainly true as to the application
of corpus linguistics to the enterprise of judging ordinary meaning. Whatever
its current limitations, "semantic analysis can, and indeed, should, turn to corpus
methods.""'
The need is acute when the interpretive task involves questions of law. Too
much rides on the resolution of legal ambiguity to resolve the matter by means
"fraught with the potential for bias and error." 9 If and when the law turns on
an assessment of ordinary communicative content we must at least try to define
and operationalize the inquiry with greater care. We see the approach outlined
here as a step in that direction.
336. GEERAERTS, supra note 247, at 178.
337 Id.
338. Glynn, supra note 136, at 7.
339. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72 ¶ 134, 356 P.3d 1258, 1290 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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